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Introduction: Confronting Post-Radical Chic
In positioning its participants "beyond critique," this symposium
rightly acknowledges the distance that has opened between the radical
political aspirations and the deconstructive methods of "critical" schol-
arship in law and literature. But it wrongly suggests that in a race be-
tween political commitments and intellectual fashions, politics has left
method in the dust. American radicalism is now one generation removed
from the Port Huron statement. In that time, its adherents have moved
"beyond" structuralism and "beyond" modernism, into a textual world
they aspire not so much to change as to review.
Radical theory's recent preoccupation with critical technique repre-
sents a strategic retreat from political engagement. No longer hoping to
* Professor of Law, S.U.N.Y. at Buffalo; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
A.B. 1977, Princeton University; J.D. 1980, Yale Law School. This essay benefitted from conversa-
tion with Alex Aleinikoff, Vince Blasi, Phoebe Ellsworth, George Kannar, Leo Katz, Larry Kramer,
Jim Krier, Mark Linder, Bill Miller, Dennis Patterson, Rick Pildes, Peter Pitegoff, Nick Rine, Jack
Schlegel, Jonathan Simon, Rob Steinfeld, J.B. White, Sarah Zearfoss, and Phil Zylberberg.
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influence events, "progressive" intellectuals resigned themselves to keep-
ing ahead of them. And as the tide of battle turned, the first to declare
victory and flee the field could claim the honor of the avant-garde.
When critical theory now advertises itself as "post"-structuralist or
"post"-modern, it makes a claim to currency rather than courage; it
boasts of being the latest item to appear on the shelves. This is how one
persuades consumers, not citizens. But the trendy packaging cannot con-
ceal the fact that the product itself has fallen out of fashion. Straddling
the widening gap between "radical" and "chic," critical theorists are in-
creasingly tempted to turn the cutting edge of critique against radicalism
itself. Bernard Yack, a "deconstructive"I critic of radical theory, diag-
noses this post-radical condition in the following terms:
In recent years the New Left's intoxication with Marxist the-
ory has given way to a rather painful hangover. In the cold light of
dawn, many radicals have begun to take a second, more critical
look at the theories that once inspired them. As a result, we now
find radical theorists taking the lead in attacking totalistic theories
of human emancipation. This stunning reversal of sentiment has
.. eroded their revolutionary spirit and sense of common purpose.
They can all agree that we must subvert modern social and polit-
ical institutions. But why we must do so and for what alternative
are questions that ... they seem reluctant to discuss....
... [Instead their] current obsession ... [consists in] decon-
structing all positive theoretical claims.
2
This diagnosis portends the death of the patient. Finally realizing
that any constructive theory of human emancipation is totalitarian, Yack
implies, radicals have abandoned constructing such theories. With no
constructive theory of human emancipation to implement, radicals must
abandon their characteristic activity of making revolution.
This Article will challenge the reduction of radical theory to recipes
for revolution, and the related assumption that any vision of human
emancipation leads to totalitarian rule. The deep problem with this sort
of critique of radical theory is its instrumental conception of the relation-
ship between theory and political experience. 3 The point is not that in
identifying philosophy as the source of revolution, we put the train in
1. B. YACK, THE LONGING FOR TOTAL REVOLUTION: PHILOSOPHIC SOURCES OF SOCIAL
DISCONTENT FROM ROUSSEAU TO MARX AND NIETZSCHE 368 (1986).
2. Yack, Toward a Free Marketplace of Social Institutions: Roberto Unger's "Super-Liberal"
Theory of Emancipation (Book Review), 101 HARV. L. REV. 1961, 1961-62 (1988) (reviewing R.
UNGER, POLITICS: A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY (1987)) (citations omitted).
3. The view that radical theory dictates radical politics is implicit in the very title of Yack's




front of Marx's "locomotive of history."' 4 The point is that, whether we
see politics as an instrument of theory or theory as an instrument of poli-
tics, we wrongly assume that political values can be defined apart from
the processes that realize them.
5
Political values do not determine politics from the outside-they
emerge already embodied in political experience. Thus we should not
accept the testimony of revolutionaries that revolution is an instrument
for the implementation of a theory. Instead, revolutionary movements
are one type of social setting for the construction and articulation of
political values. As a result, the pursuit of revolution has itself been a
particular way of developing visions of human emancipation; and be-
cause it can be a particularly instrumental way of envisioning human
emancipation, I will argue that the pursuit of revolution reinforces in-
strumentalism. The transcendence of instrumental culture would repre-
sent a much more radical emancipation.
I have argued that such a vision of human emancipation as the tran-
scendence of instrumental culture is implicit in much critical legal schol-
arship. 6 This challenge to instrumentalism provides the basis for a
critique of the revolutionary focus of radical theory, which I present in
Part I of this Article. I first identify radical politics with the aspiration
to transform human nature. I then argue that, as a matter of history,
radicals have generally identified the radical transformation of human
nature with revolution-but, to the extent that radical revolutionaries
have accepted a positivist conception of revolution as a change of legal
systems, they have been misled into assuming that human nature can be
legislated. The inevitable frustration of this assumption in the experience
of revolution engenders an impulse to restrict authority to an ever nar-
rower circle of the virtuous. In this way revolutionary politics tend to
become focused on the instrumental control rather than the emancipa-
tion of society.
My purpose in presenting this critique of revolution is by no means
to undercut the possibility of radically transforming human nature. By
emphasizing the cultural construction of preferences my critique of in-
strumentalism reaffirms the possibility of radical change through the de-
velopment of cultures of democratic participation. In Part II, I offer a
conception of emancipation as collective self-realization through demo-
4. K. MARX, The German Ideology, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 164 (R. Tucker ed.
1978) (translated as "driving force of history").
5. See generally Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First Amendment,
55 S. CAL. L. REv. 293 (1981) (defining instrumentalism as the separation of means and ends).
6. See Binder, Beyond Criticism, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 888 (1988).
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cratic participation in community life. I explain why I think such collec-
tive self-realization would require cultural change and why I think such
cultural change should be viewed as radical change-as a change in
human nature.
The reconstruction of radicalism I sketch in Part II depends on four
concepts that post-structuralist critics have attempted to "deconstruct":
participation, community, human nature, and culture. Seeing all com-
munication as the consumption and transmission of "scripted" dis-
course,7 deconstruction presents direct democracy as impossible and its
edifying effects as illusory. From this perspective community is impossi-
ble, and its pursuit entails a totalitarian suppression of "the difference
between subjects." Similarly, the concepts of human nature and cul-
tural identity may be seen as authorizing efforts to purify society of un-
natural or inauthentic elements. And, if we cannot legitimately identify
distinct cultures, we cannot hope to radically improve society by chang-
ing its cultural identity. Underlying each of these particular critiques is
an image of radicalism as a pathological yearning for a simpler world,
purged of heterogeneity. For deconstructive critics, a radical is one who
longs for fusion with others, but, fearing that any relationship will
change her, annihilates anyone she cannot absorb.
In Part III, I show how this critique distorts radicalism and I defend
the concepts of participation, community, human nature, and culture
against representative "deconstructions." I demonstrate that the project
of transforming human nature through participating with others in dem-
ocratic communities depends on heterogeneity. Participation in a com-
munity enables us to be challenged, developed, and changed because it
requires that we interact with people different from ourselves. Commu-
nity is not a ruse for fixing and insulating a presocial self-it is the pur-
suit and development of a social identity.
I. A Critique of Revolution
In this Part, I argue that the pursuit of revolution is incompatible
with radical politics. "Revolution" has come to signify an impossibly
complete break with the past. Revolutionary efforts to expunge all trace
of the past engender cycles of purgation and exclusion that prove incom-
patible with participatory democracy, an important value in the radical
tradition.
7. See B. PALMER, DESCENT INTO DISCOURSE: THE REIFICATION OF LANGUAGE AND THE
WRING OF SOCIAL HISTORY 3 (1990).
8. Young, The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, in FEMINISM/POST-MOD-




I develop this argument in four steps. First, I offer an historically
grounded definition of radicalism as the aspiration to transform human
nature, and explain how this goal came to be identified with revolution.
Second, I show that revolution has generally been conceptualized as a
legal phenomenon, an abrupt hiatus between legal orders. Third, I show
how the indeterminacy critique developed by critical legal studies under-
mines any such concept of revolution by denying the distinguishability of
discrete legal orders. Fourth, I argue that the equation of radical change
with revolution rests on an impoverished conception of human nature
and discourages the widespread participation in politics that radicals
have traditionally seen as the means to transforming human nature.
A. The Revolutionary Model of Radical Change
We tend to equate radicalism with the urge to break with the past,
to be thoroughly up to date. Yet radical political theory is linked to
classical political thought by their common aspiration to fulfill human
nature.9 The starting point for the radical tradition is Aristotle's asser-
tion that human nature finds fulfillment in political life.10 The possibility
of radical political theory is opened by an ambiguity in this formula:
does the good society conform to a fixed human nature, or can human
nature be reformed to realize the good society? Radicalism finds its faith
in the latter ambitious aspiration.
Liberalism rejects this classical tradition as at once naive and repres-
sive. Finding fulfillment in political life would require more virtue than
humans can muster. Widespread political participation can only be won
at the price of either coercion that ultimately kills political life or conflict
that rips apart the polity. 1 One liberal tradition claimed that only a
highly attenuated political life conforms to a human nature seen as
largely devoid of virtue, 12 while another saw more virtue in private be-
nevolence than in the fulfillment of public duty.
13
Rousseau initiated the radical tradition in political theory by taking
another path: he hewed to the classical tradition, insisting that social life
rendered politics unavoidable. 14 If private interest corrupted politics, the
9. See S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION: CONTINUITY AND INNOVATION IN WESTERN
POLITICAL THOUGHT 302 (1960).
10. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 8 (Bk. I, ch. 2) (E. Barker ed. 1948); G. SABINE, A HISTORY OF
POLITICAL THEORY 119-22 (E. Corwin 3d ed. 1959).
11. See G. ALMOND & S. VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE 186 (1965); S. HUNTINGTON, POLIT-
ICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 265-66, 401-02, 430-31 (1970).
12. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 608-12 (1969).
13. See G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
194-96 (1978) (discussing the Scottish Enlightenment).
14. See J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 17-19 (L. Crocker ed. 1967).
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solution was to expunge it from society. Since human beings could not
exist apart from society, Rousseau reasoned, any interest corrosive to so-
ciety ultimately threatened the self.15 Human beings literally could not
afford private interest.
16
While breaking with classicism on the question of humanity's capac-
ity for virtue, liberalism followed classical tradition in considering
human nature unalterable. 17 Rousseau broke with both classicism and
liberalism on this point, treating human nature as an alterable social
product.1 8 Private interest was not innate, but was cultivated in each
individual by others bent on dividing in order to conquer those they
could not bribe. Self-interest was therefore socially imposed, and the
pursuit of self-interest was an expression of slavery, not of liberty. What
liberalism took to be essential to human nature-individual identity-
was seen by Rousseau as an artifice subject to human will.19
Humanity might redeem itself from slavery to particular masters by
a deliberate act of subordination of each to all.20 Binding oneself to soci-
ety as a whole, each individual would be redeemed from slavery to his or
her particular will much as Greek slaves could be redeemed from servi-
tude to a particular master through bondage to a god. In return for sur-
rendering up one's particular self, each member of Rousseau's republic
would receive in return a civic identity.
21
Rousseau was not, of course, the first to think that human nature
could be transformed. Basic to Christianity is a view of sin as self-aliena-
tion or self-enslavement. Equally basic is the belief that human faith and
divine grace can redeem humanity from its fallen state. Here, too, a
transformation in human nature is figured as the redemption of a slave
through consecration to a god. Just as slavery was imagined to have
15. Id. at 23; see G. BINDER, TREATY CoNFLICr AND PoLrriCAL CONTRADICTION 75-76
(1988).
16. It must be noted that Rousseau's fear and subordination of privacy reflected a fear and
subordination of the women he would confine to the private sphere. See J. ROUSSEAU, supra note
14, at 140; J. MILLER, ROUSSEAU: DREAMER OF DEMOCRACY 203 (1984); S. OKIN, WOMEN IN
WESTERN POLrICAL THOUGHT 99-194 (1979). This could give rise to a critique of the Rousseauian
ideals of community and direct democracy as essentially rather than incidentally sexist. Such a
critique could only succeed if it avoided reliance on the deconstructive arguments I discredit in Part
III, subparts A and B.
17. Cf A. HIRSHMANN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR
CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 12-14 (1977) (discussing the seventeenth-century emergence of
the belief that a realistic understanding of human selfishness was necessary to pragmatic political
theory).
18. See J. ROUSSEAU, supra note 14, at 19, 22-23, 43.
19. See J. RoUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN AND FOUNDATION OF INEQUALITY AMONG
MANKIND 211, 219-20, 224-25 (L. Crocker ed. 1967).
20. J. ROUSSEAU, supra note 14, at 61-62.




originated in the slave's cowardly choice of captivity over death in battle,
Christ is deemed to have purchased the slave's fidelity by dying in his
place, thus restoring him to honor.22
By supplying this image of redemption from sin, Christianity intro-
duced the imaginative possibility of transformation into the classical
political tradition. But that does not make Christianity in and of itself
radical. 23 An additional element is needed to make the ideal of human
transformation politically radical: the utopian vision of a social context
for such transformation.
Christianity's radicalism therefore depends upon whether the re-
demption of humanity is conceived as a worldly project, or as a wholly
spiritual event. The key question is not when redemption occurs-before
or after death-but where. Radicalism requires that it occur in the social
world. An inner state of grace, even one achieved by human will, has no
political meaning if it is entirely self-generated. If we can each achieve
redemption individually, without society's help, the health of our souls
does not depend on the health of society. Since the pursuit of such re-
demption accepts society as it is, it does nothing to improve the prospects
of others for redemption. To thus consign one's fellows to their fallen
state is to make a separate peace with sin.
Extending the metaphor of alienation as a kind of enslavement, soli-
tary redemption is like a manumission that leaves the institution of slav-
ery intact.24 This is the radical view of redemption: what does it profit
one to win her own soul and lose the world? Radicalism requires both:
personal transformation is its goal, but society must be its medium.
If mainstream Christianity is not necessarily radical, radicalism can
nevertheless be found in Christianity's millenarian tradition. Based on
interpretation of the Book of Revelation,25 millenarian thought looks for-
ward to dramatic worldly reform. Contrary to common misconception,
millenarianism does not equate such reform with the last judgment and
22. See 0. PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH 70-76 (1982); cf D. DAVIS, THE PROB-
LEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 84-85 (1966) (discussing the Christian belief that Christ
redeems from slavery to sin).
23. See Binder, Angels and Infidels Hierarchy and Historicism in Medieval Legal History, 35
BUFFALO L. REV. 527, 554-72 (1986) (arguing that the idea of worldly progress was absent from
medieval scholasticism).
24. Rejecting the merely spiritual redemption offered slaves by white preachers, Frederick
Douglass linked his spiritual freedom to common struggle and his worldly freedom to the abolition
of slavery for all. See F. DOUGLASS, MY BONDAGE AND MY FREEDOM 275-76, 441-45 (1855 ed. &
photo. reprint 1968) (rejecting "slaveholding priestcraft" and arguing the impossibility of his cele-
brating the Fourth of July until "the great principles of political freedom and of natural justice,
embodied in the Declaration of Independence," are extended to all slaves).
25. See Revelation 20:1-6 (describing the binding of Satan and the millennial age).
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the ascension of all souls. 26 Instead, these events are foreshadowed in
human history by apocalyptic conflict, leading to a last battle and the
worldly triumph of good over evil.27 Human good reigns on earth for
one thousand years, followed by the last judgment.28
Out of this tradition grows the association of radical transformation
with revolution. The good society represents a catastrophic break with
the past. It is initiated suddenly, violently, angrily, as if prefiguring the
terrible swift sword of divine judgment. Millenarian enthusiasm was as-
sociated with violent, if somewhat aimless, popular movements in medie-
val Europe, 29 with insurrection in Renaissance Florence,30 and most
famously with the Puritans of seventeenth-century England. An oft-
quoted sermon of the Reverend Thomas Case to Parliament in 1641 cap-
tures the brutal urgency associated with radical reform. Before being
newly planted, society must be thoroughly uprooted:
Reformation must be Universall.... I beseech you, reform all
places, all persons and callings; reform the Benches of Judgment
.... Reform the Church.... Reform the Universities, reform the
Cities, reform the Countries, reform the inferiour Schools of
Learning; reform the Sabbath, reform the Ordinances, the worship
of God.... You have more work to do than I can speak. Every
plant which my heavenly father hath not planted shall be rooted
up.... Not broken off, then it may grow, and sprout again; but
pull'd up by the very roots. If it be not a plant of God's planting,
what do's it in the Garden? Out with it, root and branch, every
plant, and every whit of every plant.3
1
The millenarian tradition helped spawn the radical reinterpretation
of classical political theory by linking the Christian project of redeeming
human nature to the classical goal of erecting the good society. But it
also brought to the radical tradition an apocalyptic aesthetic and an ago-
26. Cf E. TUVESON, REDEEMER NATION 11-12, 29-33 (1968) (noting that seventeenth-century
theologians emphasized the ultimate defeat of evil by humanity and within history).
27. See Revelation 19:11-21 (describing the Second Coming of Christ, the battle of Armaged-
don, and its immediate aftermath).
28. See generally E. TUVESON, supra note 26, at 30 ("The Kingdom of God on earth... is to be
no fantastic, preposterous dreamland in which the saints get their rewards and their revenge, but
such a condition as we should expect if honest, rightly motivated men, filled with the grace of the
Gospel, were to exercise supreme control." (citing J. EDWARDS, HISTORY OF THE WORK OF RE-
DEMPTION 168 (1830))).
29. See N. COHN, THE PURSUIT OF THE MILLENNIUM 89-186 (rev. ed. 1970) (describing mille-
narian movements associated with the crusades, messianic deification of the Emperor Frederick II,
flagellant movements, and the heresy of the Free Spirit).
30. J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 103-13 (1975).
31. Lasky, The Birth of a Metaphor: On the Origins of Utopia & Revolution (pt. II), ENCOUN-
TER, Mar. 1970, at 30, 30 (quoting T. Case, Two Sermons Lately Preached at Westminster, before
Sundry of Honorable House of Commons (1641)); see M. WALZER, THE REVOLUTION OF THE




nistic understanding of history. Thus, a third element came to be seen by
many as a prerequisite to radical change, if not a defining feature. For
many, radical change is the social transformation of human nature as a
consequence of violent struggle. It was the association of change with
violence that made revolution seem indispensable.
During the French Revolution, this association was made explicit.
Revolutionary came to mean "expeditious and arbitrary." 32 The "revo-
lutionary instrument" was the guillotine.33 Rousseau's democratic radi-
calism, constantly invoked by Marat3 4 and Robespierre, 35 seemed to
authorize such violent revolution. To the sans-culottes, Rousseau stood
for the proposition that "the ultimate foundation of sovereignty... was
... insurrection: the armed uprising of the citizenry," the remaking of
law "at the point of the sword."' 36 When conceived as a vehicle for radi-
cal change, the purpose of revolution was to remake not only laws, but
also humanity. In 1793 the Lyons Surveillance Committee decreed that
building a Republic would require that each citizen "experience and ef-
fect within himself a revolution equal to that which has changed the face
of France.
'37
Even beyond France's borders, the Revolution was greeted as radi-
cally transformative of "the whole previous constitution of the world."38
German university students in particular "identified their personal crises
with the historical crisis of European culture and connected the possibil-
ity of a satisfactory resolution to the hopes for a collective historical
transformation aroused by the French Revolution." 39 Endorsing Rous-
seau's aspiration to transform humanity,4° they invented the new voca-
tion of radical theorist and populated it with a dazzling array of
luminaries: Hegel, Hoelderlin, Fichte, Schelling, and Schiller, followed
by Strauss, Bauer, Ruge, Feuerbach, and Marx.
Within France, Rousseau's memory received homage of a very dif-
ferent sort. After Robespierre's death, Gracchus Babeuf organized a
32. Ozouf, Revolution, in A CRITICAL DICTIONARY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 806, 813
(F. Furet & M. Ozouf eds. 1989) [hereinafter DICTIONARY].
33. Id.
34. See J. MILLER, supra note 16, at 1.
35. See id. at 149-50.
36. Id. at 151.
37. Ozouf, supra note 32.
38. Letter from Friedrich von Schelling to Georg Hegel (Feb. 4, 1795) (quoted in J. TOEWS,
HEGELIANISM: THE PATH TOWARD DIALECTICAL HUMANISM, 1805-1841, at 31 (1980)).
39. J. TOEWS, supra note 38, at 31.
40. See B. YACK, supra note 1, at 89-98 (analyzing Rousseau's influence on late eighteenth-
century German intellectuals).
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"Conspiracy for Equality" to carry on his work.41 Babeuf plotted a "dic-
tatorship . . . designed to help a corrupt people restore themselves to
goodness, while conquering their enemies through the unblinking use of
violence." 42 Babeuf sought redistribution of wealth, the abandonment of
cities, and a "moral regeneration . . . to be effected and preserved
through direct popular sovereignty. '43 After Babeuf's execution, one
conspirator, Philippe-Michel Buonarotti, continued attempting to plot
"communist" insurrections, eventually influencing the feared Auguste
Blanqui.44 Blanqui in turn was influential in the development of an or-
ganized communist movement, and his followers eventually joined forces
with Marx, uniting conspiratorial and theoretical radicalism.
45
In the wake of the French Revolution, European radicalism, both
within France and without, retained its identity by awaiting the signs of a
second coming.4" In the twentieth century, radical theory organized it-
self epistemologically around the experience of revolution in the same
way that science organizes itself around the experiment, and opinion re-
search around the survey.47 Radicals from Sorel to Debray embraced
revolution, not only as a stratagem for seizing power, but as a source of
self-knowledge, a school for virtue and an arena for existential choice.
48
Violent revolution was expected to yield the "New Socialist Man."
Revolution may not be intrinsic to the concept of radical change,
but it has so dominated the radical imagination that it has been easy to
use "militant" in place of "radical," easy to assume with Jefferson that
the tree of liberty must be watered with the blood of patriots,49 and easy
to forget that revolutions have not invariably cultivated our better
natures.50
41. See J. BILLINGTON, FIRE IN THE MINDS OF MEN: ORIGINS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
FAITH 72-78 (1980); J. MILLER, supra note 16, at 207.
42. J. MILLER, supra note 16, at 207.
43. Id.
44. Id. See generally J. BILLINGTON, supra note 41, at 87-92, 173.
45. See J. BILLINGTON, supra note 41, at 247, 282-86.
46. Cf K. MARX, THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE 15-18 (1963) (mock-
ing the revolutionaries of 1848 for their obsession with the revolution of 1789); F. FURET, MARX
AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 3-65 (D. Furet trans. 1988) (finding Marx guilty of the same
obsession).
47. Wolin, The Politics of the Study of Revolution, 5 COMP. POL. 343, 345-52 (1973).
48. Works in this tradition include 0. CABEZAS, FIRE FROM THE MOUNTAIN (1985); R.
DEBRAY, LA GUERILLA DE CHE (1975); R. DEBRAY, REVOLUTION IN THE REVOLUTION? ARMED
STRUGGLE AND POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN LATIN AMERICA (1967); F. FANON, WRETCHED OF THE
EARTH (1963); E. GUEVARA, GUERILLA WARFARE (1985); E. GUEVARA, SOCIALISM AND MAN IN
CUBA AND OTHER WORKS (1968); MAO TsI-TUNG, On Protracted War, in 2 COLLECTED WORKS
OF MAo TsI-TUNG 113 (1967); G. SOREL, REFLECTIONS ON VIOLENCE (1912).
49. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Colonel William Stevens Smith (Nov. 13, 1787), reprinted
in 2 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 317, 319 (H.A. Washington ed. 1893).
50. See F. Furet, Revolutionary Government, in DICTIONARY, supra note 32, at 548, 558.
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B. Revolution as a Legal Concept
From its inception, the concept of revolution has been bound up
with legal notions. The term does not appear to have been used to de-
scribe political upheavals before the fourteenth century, did not become
used widely in this sense before the sixteenth century in Italy, and was
little used in a political context in England until the seventeenth cen-
tury.51 Nevertheless, the concept of revolution developed during the
Renaissance and Reformation was rooted in a tradition of speculation
about the patterns and causes of constitutional change most associated
with Aristotle and Polybius.
5 2
Aristotle initiated the study of fundamental political change by de-
fining democratic, oligarchic, and monarchic constitutional orders, and
distinguishing a change in constitutional form from a change of ruler. In
Aristotle's thought, the constitution of a state is social: the concept
designates both the ruling class and the overall social composition of the
society. When the ruling class is no longer the dominant class in num-
bers or power, a constitutional change occurs. 53
Polybius supplied the cyclic metaphor that would eventually give
rise to the modern concept of revolution. For Polybius, a state's consti-
tution was defined by two elements-the number of participants in the
rule, and their virtue. The corrupting effect of power entailed that each
of the constitutional forms discussed by Aristotle was inherently instable.
Legitimate kingship would inevitably degenerate into despotism, leading
to an insurrection of the virtuous few. The resulting aristocracy would
degenerate into oligarchy and inspire a democratic revolt. But as the
people became corrupt, democracy would degenerate into the chaos of
mob rule, forcing the people to turn to a king. According to Polybius,
then, a cyclic change in legal order was itself ordained by natural law.5 4
In the modern era the concept of constitution grew more legal and
less social than in classical thought-but, notwithstanding shifts in the
meaning of constitution over time, it remained the correlative of revolu-
tion. Thus Locke's right of revolution proceeded from the theory that
any illegal alteration of the constitution dissolved it and authorized soci-
51. J. BILLINGTON, supra note 41, at 16-20; see Griewank, The Emergence of the Concept of
Revolution, in WHY REVOLUTION? THEORIES AND ANALYSIS 16 (C. Paynton & R. Blackey eds.
1969) [hereinafter WHY REVOLUTION?]; Hatto, "Revolution" An Enquiry into the Usefulness of an
Historical Term, 58 MIND 495, 498-500 (1949); Lasky, The Birth of a Metaphor: On the Origins of
Utopia & Revolution (pt. I), ENCOUNTER, Feb. 1970, at 35, 41-42; Lasky, supra note 31, at 30-37.
52. See Hatto, supra note 51; Lasky, supra note 31, at 33-34.
53. ARISTOTLE, supra note 10, at 245 (Bk. V, ch. III).
54. See POLYBIUS, THE HISTORIES 212-22 (Bk. VI) (E. Badian ed. 1966).
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ety to establish a new one.5 5 Often, especially in the early days of the
English, American, and French Revolutions, revolution was conceived as
a restoration of a decayed constitution, a return made necessary by a
preexisting hiatus in constitutional government.5 6 Occasionally, a revo-
lutionary program was itself given constitutive content, so that a consti-
tution was imagined as a vehicle to bring about revolutionary change.
57
Since the French Revolution, the main line of thinking has seen
revolution as an interregnum between constitutional orders, a mode of
constitutional change not authorized by the constitution.58 Robespierre
distinguished sharply between constitution and revolution59 and Hannah
Arendt has concurred that constitutions are the end-products and the
ends of revolutionary processes.6° Such nineteenth-century constitu-
tional theorists as Daniel Webster and John Jameson defined revolution
as extraconstitutional change and hence denied that there could ever be a
constitutional right of revolution.61 Charles Evans Hughes also viewed
revolution as incompatible with constitutional government. 62 On this
view insurrection aimed at restoring or realizing a constitutional order
was not, by definition, revolutionary.
From its origins, then, the concept of revolution has been defined by
its opposition to the concept of constitution. Moreover, the relationship
between these opposites has not been an equal one. If revolution and
constitution are mutually constitutive, the term constitution has clear
priority, not just chronologically, but normatively and causally. For
55. See J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 119-32 (T. Peardon ed. 1952).
56. See Binder, Revolution As a Constitutional Concept, in ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DE
METHODOLOGIE JURIDIQUE, LE RECOURS AUX OBJECTIFS DE LA Loi DANS SON APPLICATION
341, 341-52 (1990).
57. See E. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 118 (1988) (noting that "[tihe sovereignty of the people was a convenient
... fiction for a convention bent on disinheriting and displacing a monarch whose beliefs and con-
duct offended ... his subjects"); see also Binder, supra note 56, at 350 (observing that both the
French and American Revolutions were "perceived by some as the expression of constitutional tradi-
tions rooted in history").
58. However, the view that a constitution could be a vehicle for the gradual achievement of
revolution retained currency in American thought during the nineteenth century, and finds its most
articulate expression in the writings of Abraham Lincoln. See Binder, supra note 56, at 351-52.
59. See H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 132-33 (1965) (discussing Robespierre's conviction that
"constitutional government is chiefly concerned with civil liberty, revolutionary government with
public liberty").
60. Id. at 133-34.
61. See J. JAMESON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 100 (1867) (noting that an act, to be
revolutionary, must be done in violation of the customary laws); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (How.) 7,
31 (1849) (containing Webster's argument that "[o]ur American mode of government does not draw
any power from tumultuous assemblages"); cf 1 F. LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS 218-
23, 234 (T. Woolsey rev. 2d ed. 1881) (1st ed. 1838) (arguing that society alone is sovereign and that
more customary law is preserved in "revolutions" than is abrogated).




most political theorists, it is weakness in a constitutional order that gen-
erates revolution, rather than the exhaustion of the revolutionary impulse
that forms constitutions. At best, revolutions are praised as servants of
constitutional development, making the concept of revolution seem a
poor dependent on the concept of a legal order.
There is, however, a major difficulty confronting the claim that
revolution has been conceived primarily as a legal event. Surely the most
important analyst of revolution in the Western world has been Karl
Marx.6 3 Although Marx was educated in the law, he seemed singularly
uninterested in the legal conditions and consequences of revolution. He
departed from the natural law tradition of revolutionary discourse by
eschewing the concepts of law and justice in his critique of capitalism,
viewing both as superstructural adornments of an economic reality.64
Marx even seemed to regard legal institutions as ultimately unnecessary,
not just for explanation, but for social life. After the communist revolu-
tion, he claimed, law and the state would whither away.65 Hence Marx
appears to represent a decisive departure from the classical tradition of
conceiving of revolution as a hiatus between legal orders.
On closer examination, however, it is clear that Marx adapted but
nevertheless perpetuated the classical tradition. The crucial concept in
Marx's theory of revolution is the mode of production, which, like the
classical constitutional theories of Aristotle and Polybius, combines two
elements: relations of production and productive forces. As power is the
parricidal child of virtue in Polybius's constitutional theory, so the forces
of production are the parricidal children of the relations of production.
Relations between the productive forces-labor power and the means of
production66-initially develop and ultimately retard those forces. The
tension between them is resolved by a revolution which permits the pro-
ductive forces to continue their development within new relations.67
Thus change is constant, but it alternates between the normal arena of
productive forces and the revolutionary arena of productive relations.68
When the productive relations change, the revolution is complete and a
new epoch has begun. Productive relations take all the bows on the stage
63. See Tucker, The Marxian Revolutionary Idea, in WHY REVOLUTION?, supra note 51, at
215-25.
64. See Wood, The Marxian Critique of Justice, in MARX, JUSTICE, AND HISTORY 3, 3-5 (M.
Cohen, T. Nagel & T. Scanlon eds. 1980). But cf Husami, Marx on Distributive Justice, in id. at 42,
43 (arguing that Marx condemned capitalism for its injustice).
65. See J. ELSTER, MAKING SENSE OF MARX 456-58 (1985).
66. See G. COHEN, KARL MARX'S THEORY OF HISTORY: A DEFENCE 32 (1978).
67. See J. ELSTER, supra note 65, at 243; Tucker, supra note 63, at 134-38.
68. See Tucker, supra note 63, at 220-21.
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of Marxian history, while the productive forces labor backstage in
obscurity.
But what are the relations of the production? When we examine the
productive relations that concern Marx-slavery, feudalism, and espe-
cially capitalism-we see that he defines them largely in terms of the law
of property and labor relations. 69 As Jon Elster admits, "[s]ince the
property relations are 'but a legal expression for' the relations of produc-
tion, we can characterize the latter in terms of ownership and non-own-
ership of the factors of production. ' 70 The mode of production that was
supposed to provide the social base upon which a legal superstructure
could be constructed proves to be a legal construct.71
G.A. Cohen has attempted to avoid this problem by noting that
since legal rights are not always enforced, they do not always confer
power over productive forces.72 Yet the available regime for the enforce-
ment of legal rights-"the state"-is itself legally defined. 73 Hence, a
revolutionary transition from one mode of production to another is a
transition between legal orders. Although grounded in "private" as well
as "public" law, a mode of production is a legal code for ordering a soci-
ety, a constitution.
There is a difficulty with this juristic interpretation of Marx's theory
of revolution. We have developed this interpretation by assimilating
Marx's theory into classical constitutional theory. But classical constitu-
tional theory was essentially pessimistic-it predicted the inevitable cor-
ruption of every legal form. Marx, by contrast, is optimistic, predicting
the transcendence of every legal form by an ever-improving society.74
69. See G. COHEN, supra note 66, at 63-69.
70. J. ELSTER, supra note 65, at 253-54.
71. See Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 102-09 (1984); see also J. EL-
STER, supra note 65, at 402-03 (noting that "since ownership must be backed by the state and hence
presupposes a legal system, it cannot enter as an independent variable in the explanation of that
system"). Other Marxian historians who treat wage labor as the defining feature of capitalism in-
clude C.B. Macpherson and Karl Polanyi. See C. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POS-
SESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM; HOBBES TO LOCKE 53-61 (1962); K. POLANYI, THE GREAT
TRANSFORMATION 68-76 (1957).
72. See G. COHEN, supra note 66, at 217-25.
73. Kennedy, The Legal Realist Element or the Stakes of Law, LEGAL STUD. F. (forthcoming
1991). Cohen points out that a right to travel is ineffective if a gang of vigilantes can intimidate its
holder from traveling. See G. COHEN, supra note 66, at 219-20. But the decision whether and how
to enforce the right, and who is to do the enforcing (eg., federal or state officials) is subject to legal
decision making. See Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906) (overturning the conviction of
vigilantes for preventing black workers from fulfilling labor contracts in violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment).
74. "The socialist revolution suppresses fetishism, and the condition of communism to which it
leads may be described as the conquest ofform by matter." G. COHEN, supra note 66, at 129. "[N]ot
only the varying contents of currently obtaining legal relations and legal norms, but the legal form




Accordingly, he sees the communist revolution as different from other
revolutions-not just another spoke in a perpetual wheel of change, but
the culmination and end of the process. Similarly, communism is differ-
ent from other modes of production. Thus the role of law as an ordering
and identifying device for a society is said to be characteristic of the par-
ticular modes of production that precede communism, which are all
characterized by the division of labor-but not of the communist mode
of production. The communist revolution, Marx insists, will be not a
change of legal orders, but the end of legal order.75
Yet the bulk of Marx's analysis is devoted to the legal construct that
is capitalism; about the legally amorphous society of communism, he has
little to say. It is as if a society without law cannot be analyzed, ex-
plained, or even described. Even the revolution that would create such a
society commences with the transfer of ownership of the means of pro-
duction from one class to another, so that only by giving meaning to the
concepts of "class" and "ownership" can we assign any meaning to the
idea of a communist revolution. Ultimately, even Marx's concept of
communist revolution turns out to depend upon legal concepts.
76
Although attempting to develop a purely social conception of revolution,
Marx could not escape the dominant legal positivist conception of
revolution as unauthorized legal change.
C. Critical Legal Studies and Revolution
Since the French Revolution, radicalism has usually been identified
with revolution and revolution has usually been conceived as the replace-
ment of one constitutive legal order with another. Application of the
concept of revolution thus appears to require that we be able to tell con-
stitutive legal orders apart.
Yet critical legal scholars have claimed that legal doctrine is indeter-
economy." Korsch, An Assessment, in E. PASHUKANis, LAW & MARXIsM: A GENERAL THEORY
189, 189 (B. Einhorn trans., C. Arthur ed. 1978).
75. See Wood, supra note 64, at 30. "Previous revolutions within the framework of the division
of labor were bound to lead to new political institutions; . . .the communist revolution, which
removes the division of labor, ultimately abolishes political institutions." MARX & ENGELS, THE
GERMAN IDEOLOGY 416 (S. Ryazanskaya trans. 1964). This withering away of the state is also a
withering away of the relations of production and hence of law: "finally ... the communist revolu-
tion will be guided not by . . . 'social institutions' . . . but by the productive forces." Id.; cf J.
ELSTER, supra note 65, at 456-58 (criticizing this expectation as naive).
76. See Tucker, supra note 63, at 224. Elster suggests that in THE CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA
PROGRAM Marx did not deny the need for some institutional structure in the ultimate stages of
communism, but that he naively believed that these institutions would be apolitical and nonlegal
because there would be no controversy over the distribution of goods. J. ELSTER, supra note 65, at
453-58.
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minate,77 in ways that undermine our ability to distinguish constitutive
legal orders. Is labor-management strife pluralist politics or class strug-
gle?78 Is the coincidence of "individualist" and "altruist" norms in pri-
vate law constitutive or corrosive of the liberal welfare state?79 Are
"mediated contradictions" stabilizing or destabilizing? 0 Does doctrinal
conflict evidence contradiction within a single social order or confronta-
tion between past and future social orders? Such questions subvert the
criteria used by legal positivists and Marxists to identify revolutions.
77. For discussion and critique of a variety of interpretations of the indeterminacy claim, see
Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis. Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 462 (1987)
(claiming that the underlying assumptions of current critical scholars' indeterminacy theories are
problematic and that adherence to a strong view of indeterminacy is counterproductive to critical
scholarship); for my discussion, see generally Binder, supra note 6. For various applications of post-
structuralist theories of language to legal rules, see G. BINDER, supra note 15, at 49-67 (arguing that
a deconstructive reading of legislative history explains the evolution of draft convention in terms of
patterns of misreading); Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987)
(introducing the theories of Derrida); Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local
Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 685 (1985) (analyzing controversies within critical legal studies
as a debate between subjectivist and structural strands of the movement); Dalton, An Essay in the
Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985) (applying Derrida's theories to con-
tract doctrines to demonstrate doctrinal indeterminacy reflecting larger problems of knowledge and
power); Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1277 (1984) (ana-
lyzing the different defenses of bureaucracy as invocations of a misleading subject-object dichotomy);
Heller, Structuralism and Critique, 36 STAN. L. REv. 127 (1984) (suggesting that neither structural-
ist nor liberal theory sufficiently explains legal practices); Hutchinson, From Cultural Construction
to Historical Deconstruction (Book Review), 94 YALE L.J. 209, 231 (1984) (reviewing J. WHITE,
WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE,
CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY (1984)) (asserting that "[i]ndeterminacy does not require the con-
clusion that all texts are meaningless" but it does present the opportunity to find a meaning); David
Kennedy, The Turn to Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 251 (1985) (illustrating structuralist and
post-structuralist techniques of reading with an analysis of 0. Henry's Gift of the Magi); Duncan
Kennedy, A Semiotics of LegalArgument, in 3 LAW & SEMIOTICS 167, 175 (R. Kevelson ed. 1989);
(arguing that all language is political; the language of every question encourages one type of answer
and blocks other possible responses); Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv.
1152 (1985) (arguing that the differing methods of legal analysis all mediate the social relations they
represent and all rest on the subject-object metaphor in legal representational practice); Schlag, Fish
v. Zapp: The Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEo. L.J. 37 (1987) (criticizing Stanley
Fish's interpretive theory as covertly subjectivist); Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi" The Poli-
tics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 1631 (1990) (criticizing
Jack Balkin's efforts to "use" deconstruction in normative argument as covertly subjectivist). Balkin
interprets the two well-known Duncan Kennedy articles cited later in this paragraph as examples of
deconstruction. Balkin, supra, at 762-63. It seems apparent to me, however, that post-structuralism
had no influence on the first wave of critical legal scholarship, published in the 1970s. The people
who introduced post-structuralism into legal scholarship were the second-generation crits-those of
us who encountered post-structuralism as undergraduates in the 1970s, and then in law school read
first-generation crits through the prism of our post-structuralist educations. The post-structuralism
of the second generation then had a feedback influence on some of the first-generation scholars.
78. See Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1109
(1989); Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Con-
sciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1978).
79. See generally Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1685 (1976).
80. See generally Katz, Studies in Boundary Theory: Three Essays in Adjudication and Politics,
28 BUFFALO L. REv. 383, 389 (1979); Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28
BUFFALO L. REv. 205, 261 (1979).
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What's Left?
How do legal positivists tell different legal systems apart? H.L.A.
Hart's famous response to this problem was to claim that each system's
rules are related by common pedigree.81 Each of these rule families can
be identified by the rule of recognition that identifies all of its members.8 2
If constitutive legal orders are understood as rule families, the concept of
revolution permits much indeterminacy within rule families, so long as
the rules of recognition that differentiate them are determinate. But they
can't be.
Nineteenth-century positivists like Daniel Webster and John Jame-
son pointed out that the amendment of a constitutive legal order need
not be revolutionary.8 3 To count as revolutionary, a constitutional
change must not be constitutionally authorized. If it were, the new con-
stitutive order would derive its authority from the old, and so the legal
authority of the old would persist. Even changes in the rule of recogni-
tion are not revolutionary if they themselves conform to the rule of rec-
ognition. For example, if the American people amend article V
according to the procedures required by article V, they make no revolu-
tion. Thus, revolution can occur only when the rule of recognition for
constitutional law is violated. But how can a violation of the rule of
recognition ever create constitutional law? If the ratification of the Thir-
teenth and Fourteenth Amendments appear unauthorized by article V,
does that mean they were revolutionary, or does it mean that article V
was never our rule of recognition? 84
The very meaning of a rule of recognition is that no violation of it
can create law. How can we tell that a new rule of recognition has be-
come legally authoritative except by reference to some rule of recognition
for authoritative law? Revolutionaries never claim to make the people
sovereign; rather, they recognize and defend the people's preexisting sov-
ereignty. This may mean that the old constitutional regime was illegal,
but it may also mean that the old regime derived its legal authority from
popular consent-as indeed, many medieval monarchies claimed to do.8 5
Because the identification of any rule of recognition invites an infinitely
81. See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97-107 (1961).
82. Id. at 97-98. Hart defines a rule of recognition as specifying "some feature or features
possession of which by a suggested rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication that it is a rule
of the group to be supported by the social pressure it exerts." Id. at 92.
83. See J. JAMESON, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
AND LEGISLATION 484 (1869 & photo. reprint 1981); E. WHELLER, DANIEL WEBSTER: THE Ex-
POUNDER OF THE CONSTITUTION 10 (1904 & photo. reprint 1986).
84. See Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1057-70 (1984); Amar,
Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1043, 1054
(1988).
85. See G. SABINE, supra note 10, at 203-12.
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regressive inquiry as to our rule of recognition for rules of recognition,
rules of recognition are always indeterminate. If anything, it is easier to
identify the content of the law than to identify its source of authority. 86
For one observing a legal system from the inside, no unauthorized
change in the rule of recognition is possible. But an "external" observer
faces the same difficulty: whatever criterion she employs to identify an
authoritative legal system is her rule of recognition. There is no external
perspective from which to identify two rule systems as distinct and le-
gally authoritative.
How do Marxists identify revolutions? Marxian revolutions involve
the replacement of one mode of production with another and, as I have
argued, modes of production are constitutive legal orders.87
Critical legal scholar Roberto Unger has argued that the Marxist
theory of revolution is undermined by its inability to distinguish between
modes of production. 8 How does Marx define the concept of capitalism,
the paradigm for all modes of production? According to G.A. Cohen's
influential analysis of Marx, at least three factors are critical for the iden-
tification of a capitalist economy: (1) a predominance of "free labor,"
understood as the condition in which a laborer owns all of her own labor
and none of the means of production;8 9 (2) commodity production for
private accumulation of wealth;90 and (3) sufficient accumulation of
wealth to enable industrialization. 91 But Unger points out that there is
no necessary connection between commodity production and the devel-
opment of a labor market, or between a labor market and industrializa-
tion, or between industrialization and private accumulation. 92 Any rule
of recognition for capitalist societies based on these criteria will be both
under- and over-inclusive.
The critical assumption underlying Marx's conception of capitalism
is that "free labor" is economically necessary to industrialization. 93 This
assumption is undermined by the irreparable ambiguity of the concepts
of free labor and economic necessity. Each of these concepts is analyti-
cally related to the concept of desire. To say, as Cohen does, that the
"free laborer" has property in her labor, is to say that her labor can only
86. See Fitzmaurice, The Foundations of the Authority of International Law and the Problem of
Enforcement, 19 MOD. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1956) (noting the difficulty inherent in any inquiry as to the
source of authority for a particular rule of international law).
87. See supra notes 63-76 and accompanying text.
88. R. UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SrruATION AND Is TASK 101-19 (1987).
89. See G. COHEN, supra note 66, at 64-69, 82-83, 181.
90. See id. at 80-81.
91. See id. at 180-81.
92. See R. UNGER, supra note 88, at 100-04.




be utilized with her consent. 94 To say that a "free labor" market makes
possible industrialization by utilizing labor more efficiently is to say that
it better fulfills desires. Because Marx's theory of revolution is a variant
of economic determinism, it shares the tendency of liberal economics to
treat individual desire as an independent variable. A market is a means
of aggregating desires. If one claims that the introduction of a free labor
market better fulfills desires, one wrongly assumes that desires are in-
dependent of the means by which they are aggregated into social
choice.95
The instability of desire over time renders the concept of free labor
indeterminate. Are specifically enforceable contracts for personal service
expressions of "free labor" or involuntary servitude?96 As early as 1821,
the Indiana Supreme Court held that so enforcing an indenture would
violate the prohibition on involuntary servitude in the state's constitu-
tion.97 But as late as 1897, the United States Supreme Court denied that
the specifically enforceable labor contracts of merchant sailors violated
identical language in the Thirteenth Amendment. 98 In respecting the
sailor's freedom at the time of contracting, the Court sacrificed his free-
dom at the time he jumped ship, thereby designating his former self cus-
todian of his later self's interests. In recognizing the indentured
servant's freedom at the time she left service, the Indiana court reduced
her freedom at the time of contracting, effectively designating her later
self custodian of her former self's interests. The instability of desire pre-
cluded these courts from simply respecting the autonomous preferences
of either laborer. Both decisions upheld "free labor"; yet both were pa-
ternalistic.99 Because we cannot uncontroversially identify individual
94. See id. at 182-83 (stating that in capitalism the laborer is free to contract with the specific
landlord he wishes); see also Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabil-
ity: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1105 (1972) (defining a property entitle-
ment as one that cannot be taken from its holder without her consent).
95. See K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); A. MACKAY,
ARROW'S THEOREM: THE PARADOX OF SOCIAL CHOICE 2 (1980) (showing paradoxes entailed by
this assumption). For a painstaking and penetrating critique of this assumption in its home terrain
of social choice theory, see Pildes & Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory,
Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121 (1991).
96. See generally R. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES
(forthcoming 1991) (exploring the meanings attached to indentured servitude and its disappearance).
97. Mary Clark's Case, 1 Blackf. 122, 126 (Ind. 1821).
98. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 288 (1897).
99. See M. HOLLIS, MODELS OF MAN 99-100 (1977) (noting that preferences cannot be
respected as autonomous without imposition of some independent criterion of "rational" prefer-
ences); M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 137 (1987) (acknowledging that "[i]n
practice.., paternalism and sensitivity to ambiguous choice are inevitably entwined"); Regan, Pa-
ternalism, Freedom, Identity, and Commitment, in PATERNALISM 113, 113-38 (R. Sartorius ed.
1983) (arguing that the identification of preferences involves intrapersonal paternalism); cf Sunstein,
Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1171 (1986) (assuming that
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preferences, we can give no determinate meaning to the concept of free
labor that underlies Marx's concept of capitalism.
The instability of desire also undermines the determinacy of con-
cepts like economic efficiency that aggregate individual desires.'0 Thus
even if Marx could define free labor, he would have difficulty demon-
strating that free labor was economically necessary to industrialization.
And this claim is crucial to Marx's conception of capitalism as both a
system and a necessary stage in the development of the productive forces.
Marx would have denied that his conception of economic necessity
was based on any notion of desire. For Marx, economic life consisted in
production rather than consumption, and the value of products was a
function of labor rather than consumer demand. Thus "economic neces-
sity" would have meant "necessary to production," not "necessary to the
satisfaction of consumer demand." "Free labor" then, was "necessary"
in the sense of necessary to the development of industrial production.
An analysis of this claim, however, will show that its validity de-
pends on culturally contingent preferences. In characterizing bondage as
a "fetter" on the development of the productive forces, Marx meant that
it inhibited production by misallocating labor: bound laborers have no
incentive to seek more productive tasks. And less production means less
social surplus to invest in the development of industry.
But unless we specify the "consumer" preferences of laborers and
employers for different labor relations, we cannot conclude that a market
in free labor will allocate work more efficiently than a market in bound
labor. This follows from the familiar Coase theorem that, absent transac-
tion costs, allocative efficiency does not depend on the distribution of
entitlements. 101 From the standpoint of efficiency, the choice of remedy
for personal service contracts is as irrelevant as the choice of remedy for
any contract.
In a famous illustration of this principle, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court refused to specifically enforce a mining company's promise to re-
store Mrs. Peevyhouse's land at the conclusion of their mining operation,
because the restoration would have cost more than it would have added
to the market value of the land. 10 2 But if both parties are "rational utility
maximizers," it shouldn't matter whether courts remedy breach specifi-
cally or monetarily. For some figure between the benefit to Mrs.
justifications for interfering with private preferences based on their changeability can avoid
paternalism).
100. See M. KELMAN, supra note 99, at 124-50.
101. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).




Peevyhouse and the cost to the mining company of restoring the land,
Mrs. Peevyhouse will agree to leave the land as it is. And if Mrs.
Peevyhouse is "irrationally" insistent upon restoring the land, neither
remedy will prevent Mrs. Peevyhouse from achieving this "inefficient"
result at her own expense. If she receives damages, the irrational Mrs.
Peevyhouse pays the cost of restoration directly. If she accepts specific
performance, she pays the opportunity cost of foregoing a more lucrative
monetary settlement. Thus the court's choice of a contract remedy dis-
tributes, but does not allocate, resources.
10 3
The choice between free and bound labor is simply a choice between
a damage remedy and a specific performance remedy for contracts for
personal service. Just as the distribution to Mrs. Peevyhouse of a prop-
erty right to the mining company's landscaping services does not require
that those services be used inefficiently, so too the distribution to employ-
ers of a property right in their laborer's services doesn't prevent the effi-
cient allocation of those resources. A worker learning of a more
productive position can buy her employer out, leaving both better off.
10
Similarly, an employer discovering a more productive use for an em-
ployee can lease her services to another employer, or to the employee
herself. Like indentured labor, slave labor may also be efficiently reallo-
cated.105 The American South was probably the slave regime least hospi-
table to manumission. But even here, many slaves "hired their time" or
purchased themselves. 106
We can only conclude that slavery allocated labor inefficiently by
viewing labor as a consumer good rather than a factor of production.
Many masters refused to manumit their slaves at market price, or to per-
mit them to hire their time.10 7 Few masters invested in the education
103. But see Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theo-
rem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669 (1979) (arguing that distribution affects preferences, which in turn
affect efficient allocation); Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33
STAN. L. REv. 387 (1981) (same).
104. If the employee doesn't have the money, she can borrow it at interest, leaving all three
parties--employer, employee, and creditor-better off.
105. Cohen admits this proposition. See G. COHEN, supra note 66, at 190 (admitting that there
is no reason why the vendor of the labor power must be the laborer himself and that it could be
someone who owns the laborer); see also R. FOGEL & S. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS: THE
ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY 261-62 (1974) (quoting Gunnar Myrdal on the rela-
tively efficient allocation of labor in the slave South); id. at 234-35 (arguing that slave labor was as
efficient as free labor in industry, but more efficient than free labor in agriculture); cf H. GUTMAN,
SLAVERY AND THE NUMBERS GAME: A CRITIQUE OF TIME ON THE CROSS 8-9, 39-48 (1975)
(contesting the ability and inclination of masters to influence slaves through "positive" labor
incentives).
106. See Binder, Negating Slavery, in G. BINDER, J. BUSH & K. THOMAS, RECOGNIZING FREE-
DOM (forthcoming 1992).
107. See generally I. BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTE-
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and skilling of their slaves, or permitted their slaves to so invest. Many
masters felt that it demeaned their authority to bargain with their
slaves.'0 8 And masters correctly feared that slaves allowed to wander in
search of productive employment would run away. But this means that
the slave system failed to allocate labor efficiently because neither the
master nor the slave regarded the slave merely as a factor of production,
to be valued according to the income she might yield. Masters owned
slaves partly for the consumption value of the attendant honor, just as
slaves were often willing, though not always able, to pay more than their
own market value to consume the honor of self-ownership. 1°9 Thus
Marx's concern with the efficient allocation of labor for production can-
not be separated from the question of its efficient allocation for
consumption.
Critical legal scholars have pointed out that the concept of efficiency
is thoroughly indeterminate when applied to the allocation of resources
for consumption. Because we often incorporate our possessions into our
sense of self,' 10 how much we value a good often depends on whether we
already have it. This point applies to property in labor. Employers
whose identities are already invested in master status are more likely to
pay a premium for slave labor, while we would be surprised to learn of
freed slaves selling themselves back into slavery at any price. Thus the
efficient allocation of the entitlement to dispose of labor depends in part
on how the law distributes it.
Yet the value we place on entitlements is also contingent on cultural
norms not recognized in the law. Thus, the fact that some slaves were
willing to make great sacrifices to purchase freedom or undergo great
risks to escape shows how much they already incorporated self-owner-
ship into their self-images.
The contingency of allocative efficiency on legal and cultural norms
means that legal and cultural changes can make an efficient allocation
inefficient and vice-versa. Robert Steinfeld has shown that indentured
servitude ceased to be a profitable way to employ labor when workers
BELLUM SOUTH 138-57 (1974) (describing the legal, cultural, and economic restraints on redemption
of slaves in the South).
108. See E. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL 306 (1974) (describing a master's resentment at
his slave's demanding payment for finding beehives on the master's property).
109. There is little evidence to support the belief that jural freedom would have increased the
earning potential of most slaves in a racially stratified society; but freedom offered more dignity. See
R. FOGEL & S. ENGERMAN, supra note 105, at 236-39 (suggesting that slaves were materially de-
prived relative to white workers primarily in the sense that they would have given up a lot of mate-
rial welfare for free status, and white workers would have foregone high wages to avoid slave
working conditions).




would no longer stand for it, and courts became less willing to enforce
it. 111 Rather than economic rationality ending bound labor, the cultural
rejection of bound labor made it economically inefficient.
Marx's foremost contemporary defender denies that the cultural val-
ues that accommodate us to or alienate us from our economic roles are
themselves material forces.11 2 Yet he reluctantly admits that the relative
efficiency of what we have come to call "free" labor cannot be explained
without reference to such cultural values. 113 What made bondage a "fet-
ter" on the productive forces was the fact that the productive forces in-
cluded laborers who saw it as demeaning. What binds "free" wage labor
to the service of industrialization and accumulation to form "capitalism"
is culture. This means that capitalism can never be separated from the
"superstructure" it is supposed to explain. It also means that there is no
necessary connection among any of the defining elements of a mode of
production, and no necessary incompatibility between what are supposed
to be elements of different modes of production. 114
Critical legal scholars have argued that all legal rule systems contain
contradictions. I have tried to show that the pervasiveness of such con-
111. R. STNFELD, supra note 96, at 162-70.
112. G. COHEN, supra note 66, at 33, 113.
113. Here is Cohen's explanation:
First, it is difficult to conceive the provident habits and skilled craftsmanship which
capitalism needed in the labour force it took over as faculties of slaves. The education
presupposed by these abilities, and the sense of personal worth associated with them, can-
not be united with slave status ....
Secondly, slaves must... be... strictly policed: they require more extensive supervi-
sion than do free workers ....
Third, rising productivity leads sooner or later to a rising standard of consumption
among the producers, and that stimulates an enlarged self-awareness and a self-assertion
which are difficult to reconcile with persistence of enslavement.
Id. at 191-92. That these assumptions are not universally applicable in all cultures has been demon-
strated by Orlando Patterson. See 0. PATrERSON, supra note 22, at 299-333 (discussing highly
privileged, educated, and influential slaves in the Roman, Byzantine, and Ottoman empires).
In addition, Cohen's efficiency analysis treats supervision entirely as a cost of production, ignor-
ing its positive utility as consumption. Much of the master's security against slave escape, for exam-
ple, was provided free of charge by slave patrols composed largely of slaveless whites who seem to
have regarded the intimidation of slaves and hounding of runaways as something between ennobling
civic duty and sport.
114. Concludes Robert Steinfeld:
It has been assumed that "unfree contractual" labor and "free" labor [were] rooted in the
logic of two qualitatively different social and economic systems, one in medieval economy
and society, the other in market economy and society .... In the American colonies [,
however,] indentured servitude flourished alongside "free" labor. The two merely repre-
sented alternative legal expressions of the idea that individuals owned and could freely sell
the property in their own energies. In England, if there was a form of the wage relation-
ship that had priority [in the eighteenth century] it would have been "unfree" wage la-
bor. . .. A definitive selection . . . among these two . . . did not take place until the
nineteenth century. Not the inexorable logic of the market, but a complex process of con-
tingent social, cultural and economic struggle led ... to the ... repudiation of unfree
contractual labor.
R. STEINFELD, supra note 96, at 6-7.
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tradiction precludes us from claiming that elements of different legal sys-
tems are incompatible. This makes it very difficult for us to distinguish
conflict within a legal order from conflict between legal orders, or to
distinguish change within a legal order from the replacement of one legal
order with another. Thus, the indeterminacy thesis, as developed by crit-
ical legal studies, undermines the concept of a constitutive legal order on
which the concept of revolution depends. 115
This result poses a difficulty for critical legal scholars, who have
seen themselves as political radicals. If one can no longer distinguish
between fundamentally different social orders, what becomes of the de-
sire for fundamental change? What does it mean to be radical without
hope of revolution?
D. The Incompatibility of Radical Politics with the Pursuit of
Revolution
This section will argue that radicals should cease identifying radical
politics with the pursuit of revolution.1 16 As traditionally conceived,
revolution involves an impossibly complete break with the old order. A
political movement devoted to the pursuit of this chimera is likely to
regiment supporters and demonize enemies in ways that are incompatible
with democratic participation by large numbers of people. Revolution-
ary movements, in short, tend to develop a martial organizational form.
Since, as Part II will emphasize, participatory democracy is crucial to
radical transformation, the organizational form dictated by the pursuit of
revolution is incompatible with the aims of radicalism.
Twentieth-century radicalism has seen revolution as central to the
notion of radical transformation of human nature because it has seen
revolutionary violence as encouraging solidarity and self-sacrifice. 117 By
militarizing the conflict between an unpopular government and a pas-
sively disaffected people, guerrillas hope to impose on the populace a
choice between active support of the regime and active resistance. Re-
moving the middle ground of grudging and cynical acquiescence forces
an existential crisis in which the subject must redefine and resurrect her
115. See Binder, supra note 6, at 892-97.
116. I do not deny that the pursuit of revolution is sometimes a necessary response to intractable
injustice; but I do deny that it is likely to encourage radical change. A revolutionary strategy will be
the lesser of the two evils in many settings-but it will be an evil nonetheless.
117. See J. WODDiS, NEw THEORIES OF REVOLUTION 398 (1972) (describing two twentieth-
century radicals who saw violence as a "necessary experience in itself" and as "the cleansing fire
which tests and purifies revolutionaries"). The idea that conflict builds character has a venerable
history. See G. BINDER, supra note 15, at 83 (noting that Machiavelli, Rousseau, and Hegel viewed




civic identity.' 18 The mobilization of the populace is not only a means of
realizing the revolutionary program-it is the revolutionary program, the
desired radical change.' 9
As an answer to the question "how can one seize state power?,"
popular mobilization is unexceptionable. But how does it look as an an-
swer to the question "what does a utopian society look like?" The claim
that revolutionary mobilization is a school for civic virtue now looks like
an unconvincing dodge. It implies that citizens will be sufficiently im-
proved by the process of revolution that they need not worry about what
institutions the revolution will bring into being. The very process of
revolution will purge society of the selfish corruption that engendered the
need for revolution in the first place.
Such expectations court disaster. Lacking any legitimate institu-
tional framework, a revolutionary society is easily tempted to base the
legitimacy of its social choices on the character of its people. This ex-
plains the intense anxiety about corruption that characterizes revolution-
ary societies: any flagging of virtue threatens the legitimacy of the entire
society. When we identify revolutionary struggle as the vehicle for puri-
fying character, anyone lacking in revolutionary commitment becomes a
source of the feared impurity. But if the new order is indistinguishable
from the old, how can we be sure of anyone's revolutionary commit-
ment? Fearing impurity in ourselves, we need endless opportunities to
display our revolutionary commitment. And this means we need ever
more struggle against ever more enemies, which we can only generate by
setting ever higher our standards of purity.120 In short, without a posi-
tive program for institutionalizing character reform, revolution degener-
ates into a self-consuming cycle of internecine purges.1 21 And, as
118. See Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, in ASPECTS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 118-
20 (A. Cobban ed. 1968) (describing revolution as a competition for loyalty between two polities);
Binder, On Critical Legal Studies As Guerilla Warfare, 76 GEo. L.. 1, 10 (1987).
119. The tendency of revolution to mobilize much of the populace forms the basis for Samuel
Huntington's theory of revolution as a crisis of political participation. See generally S. HurNING-
TON, supra note 11. As Charles Tilly and his associates have argued, one reason why political partic-
ipation increases dramatically during revolutions is the availability of not one but two competing
"states," each demanding active displays of affiliation. See generally Tilly, Revolutions and Collec-
tive Action, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 520-21 (F. Greenstein & N. Polsby eds. 1975).
120. See generally B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1967) (exploring paranoid anxiety about corruption on the part of American revolutionaries); R.
HO-STADTERT, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 3-40 (1966) (discussing the prer-
evolutionary origins of rhetoric of infiltration); M. WALZER, supra note 31 (exploring psychological
and social roots of the craving for purity among Calvinist revolutionaries, particularly in England);
F. Furet, supra note 50, at 554-57 (describing how the pursuit of virtue led to terror in the French
Revolution); Ozouf, supra note 32, at 811-16 (describing revolution as a Sysiphean task).
121. Gueniffey, Robespierre, in DICTIONARY, supra note 32, at 306-09 (noting that Robespierre's
strategy for inculcating virtue was purgation, endlessly repeated). See generally H. TAINE, THE
2009
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revolution becomes increasingly oriented towards the purgation of ene-
mies, it ceases to be conceived as the construction of a new human
nature. Instead, revolution becomes revenge against an old order that
has so incurably perverted human nature that it resists radical
transformation.
An impoverished conception of identity underlies the model of
revolution as an opportunity for self-redefinition. According to this
view, the self is radically up for grabs-reconstructed anew at each mo-
ment of consciousness. The revolutionary situation, like any life-or-
death situation, reveals the contingency of all of the self's attributes and
hence frees the self from the illusory constraints of a corrupt culture.
The problem with this sort of reasoning lies in its assumption that
identity is illusory because it is culturally contingent. At bottom, this
casual dismissal of people's prerevolutionary identities reflects an essen-
tially liberal belief that the "real" self of each person is presocial. Only
from this perspective can people be stripped of their old social contexts
with no psychological costs. But a social identity is not an outer garment
covering up a true self: if we strip away the social "skin," however con-
fining, the inner being will disintegrate. Individual identity is culturally
constructed. We cannot redefine ourselves simply by dismantling the
corrupt cultural and social institutions that currently sustain individual
identities. Truly radical politics involve not just the desire to decon-
struct, but also the desire to reconstitute society; not just the desire to
uproot, but the recognition that social life requires roots.
When the goal is the destruction of an existing culture, revolution
may not be necessary. Cultures are fragile-most of the traditional
sources of authority in French society were already in retreat before the
revolution.12 2 If the goal is the construction of a new culture, the violent
conflict engendered by the pursuit of revolution is not especially integra-
tive. As romantic critics of the French Revolution have long argued, the
pursuit of revolution destroys the social contexts that sustain identity and
inform human behavior with values, without necessarily replacing those
contexts. 1
23
Revolutionary organization may take many forms, but none are
ANCIENT REGIME 191-251 (1962) (arguing that the abstract utopian ideology of the French Revolu-
tion led to brutality).
122. See generally S. SCHAMA, CITIZENS: A CHRONICLE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1989)
(synthesizing recent histories stressing the fast pace of change in prerevolutionary France). The
original expression of this thesis was A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE OLD REGIME AND THE REVOLU-
TION (S. Gilbert trans. 1955).
123. Works in this tradition include H. ARENDT, supra note 59; K. BAKER, INVENTING THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION (1990); E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (1968);




very conducive to the achievement of radical aims. The mass movements
that characterize successful insurrections are neither sufficiently intimate
nor sufficiently stable to sustain identity. Toppling only those govern-
ments incapable of solving preexisting problems, successful revolutionary
movements inherit crises requiring an authoritarian response. Thus,
Hannah Arendt argues that social revolutions quickly subordinate de-
mocracy to the more pressing problem of organizing and coercing the
redistribution of resources.124 Theda Skocpol argues that successful so-
cial revolutions are generally facilitated by foreign military or economic
threats to which they must respond. 125 No matter how ideologically op-
posed to programmatic thinking and institutional embodiment a revolu-
tionary movement may be, events will supply a program and engender
institutions. As a result, revolutionary success generally depends upon
the erection of a hierarchical bureaucracy, not participatory democracy.
The revolutionary regime achieves legitimacy by more effectively mobil-
izing people and resources to achieve the goals of the old regime, rather
than by involving more people in the definition of societal goals. To the
extent that radicals find our own society already too impersonal, too in-
strumental, too bureaucratic, and too managed, the path of revolution
will not lead in the direction of radical change.
Of course, not all revolutionary movements achieve success. What
are the cultural consequences of revolutionary politics prior to revolu-
tion? The more serious people are about making revolution, the more
they risk repression. The more they risk repression, the more likely they
are to act and meet in secret. And secret organizations tend not to be
very democratic. A secret conspiracy can provide its participants with
an intimate context for the construction and recognition of identity, but
the risk of betrayal makes the participants dependent on one another to a
degree that invites paranoia. The rigid military discipline imposed by the
need for secrecy makes the revolutionary cell an outpost of instrumental
culture, rather than a prefiguration of utopia. Accordingly, professional
revolutionaries are social technicians, analyzing, predicting, and manipu-
lating society from the outside. In this respect, their self-images resemble
those of mainstream policy analysts.1 26 Far from advancing radical
goals, "professional" revolution reproduces and reinforces the instru-
photo. reprint 1950); G. HEGEL, HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT ('. Knox trans. 1967); and A. DE
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 122.
124. H. ARENDT, supra note 59, at 60-114.
125. T. SKOCPOL, STATES AND SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND CHINA 50 (1979).
126. See MacIntyre, Ideology, Social Science, and Revolution, 5 COMP. POL. 321, 340-42 (1973).
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mental culture that, Part II will argue, it is the contemporary task of
radical politics to transform.
II. Radicalism Reconstructed
A. A Cultural Concept of Radical Change
Radicals have traditionally aspired to revolution, and revolution has
generally been perceived as a change of legal systems. Since critical legal
studies persuasively argues that the concept of a legal system is incoher-
ent, it undermines the aspiration to revolution that has supplied radicals
with their dominant image of radical change. Hence, if we wish to pre-
serve the aspiration to radical social change, we have to separate it from
the revolutionary aspiration. In Part I, I argued that the pursuit of
revolution is probably incompatible with the attainment of the kind of
society that most self-identified radicals desire: a society characterized
by community, participatory democracy, and self-realization. "Radical"
goals need not be pursued by revolutionary means. In fact, radicals
should probably reject revolution for political, as well as conceptual,
reasons.
But there remains a conceptual problem that this political argument
does not address. Is radical social change conceptually distinguishable
from revolution? As my critique of the concept of mode of production
illustrates, conceptions of social order tend to be just as lawlike as con-
ceptions of legal order-and just as indeterminate. If we are skeptical
about constitutive or foundational changes in law, are we not compelled
to be equally skeptical about radical changes in society? Isn't the critique
of legal determinacy built on a foundation of thoroughgoing epistemolog-
ical skepticism?
Not necessarily. Critical legal scholars have stressed the indetermi-
nacy of legal and sociological concepts based on some notion of prefer-
ence or consent. And they have denied that legal and social orders have
foundations-that is, determinate rules of recognition. But these criti-
ques need not be "founded" on skepticism or any other epistemological
position. Nor does a rejection of foundation metaphors require a rejec-
tion of the concept of radical change.
Radical change is not necessarily fundamental change. Because
foundation metaphors are essentialist, fundamental change is a contra-
diction in terms. Alter the essence of the thing and you don't change it-
you destroy it, creating something new. Change is thus inherently lim-
ited; change takes place only if some aspect of the object remains the
same. Root metaphors express this limitation. To be rooted is to be situ-




root can be seen as merely one part of an organic system, each element of
which depends on every other but which, as a whole, is in a constant flux
of growth, decay, reproduction, and evolution.
We can call change radical to the extent that it changes the identity
of human beings. But we can also recognize that personal identity is
culturally constructed rather than "natural" or "essential." Thus, identi-
ties fit into cultures in the way that roots fit into organic systems.
What is a culture? It is a stable, mutually constituting combination
of socioeconomic structures, affective associations, collectively recog-
nized identities, and individual value commitments. When I say that
each of these elements-distributions of wealth and power, associative
relationships, identities, and values--constitute each other, I do not mean
they logically entail each other. I mean that they supply meaning to one
another. Any one of these elements is "iterable," which is to say that it
can be abstracted from its relationship to the other elements. This means
both that it can be represented in language, and that it can be retained or
reproduced in a different social context. 127 Represented in isolation
from the other elements of a culture, the meaning of an identity ("citizen
of the United States," "psychological parent") or an institution ("fam-
ily," "private club," "trust," "school district") is indeterminate, because
we can easily imagine it in combination with a different social context.
Despite the independence of each of these elements, some combina-
tions turn out to be self-sustaining:
[Social] structure has consequences for the formation of associative
relationships which in turn have consequences for the formation of
character. By character I mean ... those values that people are
committed to because they have invested their sense of self in
them. Associations affect those value commitments because they
provide contexts in which people can be recognized and identified
by others as individuals defined by particular character traits. Be-
cause such traits or perceptions are built into people's self-concep-
tions and are reinforced by their social relationships, they have a
much stronger hold than any ideology. A stable culture exists
when the identities encouraged by the structure of social life direct
people to behave in ways that reproduce that structure. 128
Americans currently inhabit and reproduce a culture that I have
described as instrumental:
Instrumentalism is a culture of calculating individuals and imper-
127. See J. CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITICISM AFTER STRUCTURALISM
110-34 (1982) (discussing the relationship between meaning and iterability); Balkin, supra note 77, at
749 (arguing that iterability, "the property of being able to be repeated in many different contexts,"
is "essential to any form of communication").
128. Binder, supra note 6, at 906.
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sonal social forces. Its participants believe in the separability of
means and ends, with its corollary that ends can be defined in ad-
vance of the processes that realize them. They are planners and
resume builders, looking past every experience to its consequences.
Individually, they pride themselves on choosing their own ends;
collectively, they stockpile those resources that can serve any
end ....
Instrumentalism flourishes where socially stunted selves com-
bine to form the impersonal forces that inhibit the social develop-
ment of personal identity.129
Belief in the determinacy of desire plays an important role in instrumen-
tal culture, encouraging individuals to identify themselves with their
present desires. A person with such an instrumental identity is a "natu-
ral" consumer: when she consumes she expresses her authentic self. In
demonstrating the indeterminacy of desire, critical legal scholars have
critiqued the human nature constructed by instrumental culture. In the
next section I explicate the vision of human beings as self-realizing par-
ticipants in politics that inspires this critique. In a third section I show
how the collective pursuit of self-realization can build a cultural alterna-
tive to instrumentalism, that, even in local settings, would represent radi-
cal change.
B. Radicalizing Human Nature
Human nature, as understood by Aristotle, was both the way people
are and the way they should be. This complex concept of nature was
designed to take account of ontogenetic development, the paradox that
immature members of the same species resemble one another more than
they resemble their future selves.130 It resolved this paradox by portray-
ing human beings as naturally developing toward a particular purpose.
But it also introduced another paradox by permitting human beings to
simultaneously conform to their nature and not conform to it-they
could be on the path towards their purpose and not yet have reached it.
Hence, they could be alienated from human nature and nevertheless
human. This paradox recognized a dynamic element within human na-
129. Id. at 907-09.
130. The "nature" of an entity could be its present form, its future form, its pattern of growth, or
its purpose. See ARISTOTLE, Physics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 329-30 (Bk. II, ch.
1), 339-41 (Bk. II, ch. 8 ) (R. Hardie & R. Gaye trans. 1984). In some respects, immature members
of one species may resemble mature members of another species more than mature members of their
own. See S. GOULD, ONTOGENY AND PHYLOGENY 390 (1977) (noting that the skeletal features of
some types of less evolved juvenile primates resemble those of human adults more than they resem-




ture which radicalism has reinterpreted as the possibility that human na-
ture itself can change.
The most familiar use of the concept of human nature in political
argument is to identify innate human needs that societies are bound to
serve. Radical political theory departs from this conventional model in
two important respects. It conceives of human nature as a set of capaci-
ties rather than a set of needs, and it sees these capacities as cultivated
rather than innate. The radical thus seeks to identify capacities that soci-
eties are bound to develop in human beings.
Human nature may be conceived of in terms of such "natural"
needs as food and air, without which one cannot continue to exist as a
human being. Alternatively, human nature may be visualized as a need
prerequisite to one's full development as a human being, such as eco-
nomic independence, or political participation, or the nurturance of an-
other life. The fulfillment of these "cultural" needs may not be required
in order to be human. Instead, merely having such a need can mark one
as human, as when we identify alienation as the human condition. "Nat-
ural" and "cultural" needs can never be kept neatly separate: we need
education just to survive into adulthood.
Human nature may also be viewed as an ability or disposition, such
as the disposition to rationally maximize utility, or the capacity to make
one's own tools. Need and capacity converge in some dynamic concep-
tion of human nature as self-revising. One who sees human nature as the
capacity to redefine one's needs fulfills herself by constantly inventing
new ways of frustrating herself. This paradox is particularly evident
when the creation of new needs is a sort of unintended by-product of the
satisfaction of old ones. Desire typically has this sort of dialectical struc-
ture in writing influenced by Hegel and Marx, whether its instability is
lauded as fertile 31 or scorned as self-consuming. 132
One can see the deployment of both the need and the capacity con-
ceptions of human nature in Robin West's "Jurisprudence and Gen-
der."1 33 Based on a reading of Duncan Kennedy, Peter Gabel, and other
male critical legal theorists, West speculates that men are naturally iso-
lated but desire connection. 34 Relative to their own desires, then, men
are naturally flawed, contradictory, and incomplete. They are defined
primarily in terms of a need which, according to West, men hope that
131. Eg., the desires for recognition, self-consciousness, or meaningful work.
132. Eg., decadent compulsions such as skepticism in Hegel or the fetishism of commodities in
Marx.
133. See West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CI. L. REv. 1 (1988).
134. See id. at 44, 51-52 (discussing contradictions between the "human being" assumed by legal
theory and "women" described by feminism).
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society can artificially supply. By contrast, West sees women as natu-
rally "connected" by virtue of their capacities for pregnancy and lacta-
tion. Where men long for the connection their biology has failed to
supply, women long for the autonomy that society has deprived them
of.135 Thus men are naturally barren or empty, and in need of artificial
fulfillment. Women are naturally fertile and abundant, but are socially
oppressed.
There are difficulties here.136 West persuasively refutes the view
that human beings are, as a matter of natural fact rather than cultural
identification, distinct from each other. But she then resurrects it by
treating the isolation of males as a natural fact.
This tension in West's thinking illustrates a second dimension along
which conceptions of human nature vary: the axis between the innate
and the artificial elements of human nature. Any radical political theory
must see at least some important human characteristics as artificial, in
the sense that human action can alter or replace them with other traits.
A theory which holds that human needs can be met or that human ca-
pacities can be realized by social reform without altering human nature is
not a radical theory.
The prospects of radical theory are made happier by the fact that
human needs and capacities are alterable. Consider first human needs.
What economists call preferences change constantly, for at least three
reasons. One reason is adaptive preference formation: a good is less
available, and so a consumer wants it less. Of course, this is what the
economist would predict: when a good is less available, its price will go
up and consumers will demand less. Their demand curves haven't
changed. However, the status degradation or the gnawing frustration
implicit in wanting something we cannot afford may induce us to say
"sour grapes," adapting our preferences as well as our habits to our
newly straitened circumstances. 137 One need, cognitive dissonance re-
duction, compels the abandonment of another. 138
Another reason preferences change lies in the capacity of people to
become addicted to certain goods. Addicts demand more and more of a
particular good and are satisfied by it less and less. Jon Elster speculates
135. See id. at 35-37.
136. Just who are these naturally connected women connected to? Aren't some fetuses, breast-
feeding infants, and older but nevertheless dependent children male? And for children of both sexes,
isn't connection a need rather than a potentiality or inevitability? On the other hand, not all adult
women become pregnant, breast-feed, or otherwise nurture children. Isn't the decision to bear or
rear children social and in this sense artificial?
137. J. ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 109-40 (1983).




that consumption in general is an addiction. If Elster is right, such an
addiction is a variant of adaptive preference formation-we want con-
sumer goods because they are available. Because acquiring them does
not reduce their availability, we keep wanting them. But as we acquire
more and more, the utility we derive from each decreases. Thus, while
the activity of consumption as a whole may be addictive, consumption is
restless with respect to any particular object. The consumer's self is the
dead calm at the eye of a raging storm. Her desires are ever-changing,
but they leave her unaffected because she commits herself to none.139
Elster contrasts addictive consumption with self-realization. Activi-
ties that contribute to self-realization generate more utility the more we
engage in them, because we get better at them. Therefore, one of the
most important reasons why our needs can change is that our capacities
can change. We derive satisfaction from doing things well because this
enables us to see ourselves as more capable.
The "human" capacity for self-realization is not innate; it is cultur-
ally contingent. Because performing an activity well is socially defined,
the utility generated by self-realization depends upon recognition by
others. Activities which may engender such self-realization include
meaningful work and participation in democratic politics.140 Such activi-
ties yield increasing satisfaction only to the extent that they are sustained
over time.141 Thus, they can radically transform their participants only
by providing a stable social context in which desire can deepen.
Self-realization is very much a collective pursuit. Unlike consump-
tion, self-realization is not a zero-sum game in which my gain is your
loss. Opportunities for self-realization depend on stable political engage-
ments, intimate associations, and work environments. Accordingly, to
the extent that I commit myself over time to a particular political com-
munity or intimate association, I enhance the ability of others to do the
same. To the extent that I avoid commitment, allowing myself to be
absorbed in a whirlwind of consumption, I decrease the opportunities of
others to realize themselves. Work environments provide a variety of
opportunities for self-realization. They are potential settings for par-
ticipatory democracy and friendship, of course, but they are also poten-
tial settings for the mutual recognition of a job well done.1 42 This mutual
139. Elster, Self-Realization in Work and Politics: The Marxist Conception of the Good Life, 3
Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 97, 103-04 (1986).
140. Id. at 99. Elster notes that friendship and love can also involve increasing satisfaction,
personal transformation, and mutual recognition, but claims that they differ in that the mutual rec-
ognition is not mediated by any instrumental purpose. Id.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 115 (noting that recognition from coworkers is more important than from super-
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recognition requires colleagues who have developed competence and
have also invested their identities in the value of performing work well.
Ultimately, all types of self-realization depend on and enable the pursuit
of self-realization by others. Therefore, the rarer opportunities for self-
realization become, the more likely I am to adapt my preferences to con-
sumption, further undermining the motivation of my fellows to realize
themselves. In an instrumental culture, self-realization is hampered by
collective-action problems; its pursuit may be in the long-term interest of
all, but in the short-term interest of none.
143
Self-realization is better viewed as a capacity than as a need: we can
survive without it. Self-realizing pursuits may become addictive for
those already pursuing them; they may be necessary to the maintenance
or development of an identity that the pursuer has chosen. But, self-
realization may not recommend itself to those who are not already com-
mitted to it. Self-realization is hard work. To say that it yields increas-
ing satisfaction over time is to acknowledge that it yields little happiness
in the short run. In fact, its initial returns may be negative. 144
Nor is self-realization "necessary" for maintaining the ordinary per-
son's self-image. To the contrary, self-realization changes one's identity.
The fascination with contradiction that characterized romanticism
stemmed from the conflict between the romantic aspiration to create the
self and the romantic aspiration to express the self.145 The latter aspira-
tion proudly flaunts the self that we have-the former aspiration ruth-
lessly rejects it. Self-realization entails the alienation of the self we start
out with. Of course, we may conclude that the original self is impover-
ished. But the instant that we claim that self-realization is a human
need, we contemptuously dismiss as inhuman those who have not real-
ized themselves.
A final reason for rejecting the characterization of self-realization as
a human need is that the language of needs is the language of consump-
tion. Self-realization does not replenish us; it is not a fuel that we use up
in order to maintain ourselves. Instead it is a quest, a hard road. It uses
us up. It increasingly possesses us and discards what we were.
By definition, no radical political theory can base its normative con-
clusions on invariant human needs. But it can rest on our capacity to
visors, since the latter are paid to use profitability rather than quality of performance as the criterion
for evaluating work).
143. Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1140-47.
144. Elster, supra note 139, at 100.




collectively cultivate new needs and capacities. This is the vision of
human nature implicit in Mark Kelman's overly sanguine claim that
all choices are part of a never-equilibrating, dynamic process of
self-discovery. We continually try to establish conditions in which
more desirable selves, with particular preferences, will flourish.
Then, we reevaluate our vision of whether the chooser we create by
working to establish those conditions seems more or less realized,
then work some more to redo background conditions.
14"
Kelman is right: all choice is self-choice. But Kelman is also wrong: the
only self-definitions available on the shelves of instrumental culture are
self-consuming needs, not self-cultivating capacities. "We" cannot "es-
tablish conditions in which more desirable selves... will flourish" all by
ourselves. That is why the establishment of such conditions would repre-
sent radical change.
C. The Practical Possibility of Radical Change
Self-realization radically changes an individual in the sense that it
alters her identity. But self-realization is not an individual pursuit-it
requires the active participation of others. As a result, the radical change
of any individual requires radical social change. By this I mean that for
any individual to change many must change, and that these changes are
mutually dependent. I think this sort of change is possible because
projects of self-realization are not just mutually dependent-they are mu-
tually reinforcing. Self-realization, in other words, is a characteristic of a
culture.
I call instrumentalism a culture because instrumental behavior is
causally related to other instrumental behavior. The more I view the
other people as instruments and obstacles to the realization of purposes I
define on my own, the less available I am for the kind of long-term dia-
logue and cooperation that facilitates self-realization. This has conse-
quences both for others and for myself. My instrumentalism reduces the
opportunities and incentives for others to self-realize and encourages
them to define their purposes in isolation. This in turn reduces my op-
portunities for self-realization in the future. In addition, since the re-
wards of self-realization increase over time, current consumption reduces
my future incentive to self-realize. Thus instrumentalism is a culture in
the sense that instrumental behavior and instrumental attitudes
reproduce themselves.
Self-realization could define a culture in this same sense. Because
self-realizing behavior increases the future opportunities and rewards of
146. Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. Rnv. 769, 787.
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self-realization for the actor and for others, self-realization also can
reproduce itself. Empirical studies of worker participation in workplace
decision making suggest that it permanently changes not only the way
people view themselves, but the way they treat others. Participation
builds self-esteem by changing the experience of work. This enhances
workers' belief in their political competence and motivates them to or-
ganize other settings in which they can exercise it.
Participation in management can make even "dirty" work a source
of pride. One former member of a garbageman's cooperative lamented,
"I miss the meetings.... It was a terrific feeling to own a company at
22 .... I used to walk out of here at night, look back at all the trucks, and
say to myself, 'this is mine. I own one of these trucks.' "147 Said a mem-
ber of one such co-op to his interviewer: "Look, it's Jerry isn't it? Jerry,
if you want to work along with us, that's fine, but watch the spillage in
the street when you dump your sack into the hopper .... Public Rela-
tions, you know. It means everything for the company. That's what
makes us."' 148 Said a woman who worked in an illegal abortion collective
in the 1960s:
You think you could never stick your hand into a toilet bowl full of
blood and vomit and pull out a placenta and look at it. You think
you could never put a needle into somebody's ass. But you have to
do it and you're the only person who can do it-you do it. And
once you've done it, you say, my God, I can do this. 14
9
Despite such traumatic work, another member of this collective con-
cluded "My participation in the service grew me into the person I was
meant to be." 150 These quotes reveal that participation is transformative
because it is more than just talk, it is sharing in responsibility for one's
own actions. Doing a dirty job has a completely different meaning when
one is taking responsibility rather than taking orders: it feels like a cou-
rageous sacrifice rather than a craven surrender.
Because participation changes the way that workers view them-
selves, it can change their beliefs about their capacity for participation. 151
Workers who have never been offered managerial responsibility often
deem themselves incompetent. 52 But
147. Russell, The Rewards of Participation in a Worker-Owned Firm, in WORKPLACE DEMoc-
RACY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 109, 116 (F. Lindenfeld & J. Rothschild-Whitte eds. 1982).
148. Id. at 113.
149. Schlesinger & Bart, Collective Work and Self-Identity: Working in a Feminist Illegal Abor-
tion Collective, in WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 147, at 139, 146.
150. Id.
151. See generally POLITICAL LEARNING IN ADULTHOOD 89-202 (R. Sigel ed. 1989) (discussing
studies and theories of political socialization in the workplace).




a structure of participation... in the long run becomes more effec-
tive because of the eventual compatibility of personality with struc-
ture. In other words, the organization that permits participation
ultimately produces individuals who are responsible to
participation. 
153
One British auto worker's description of participation at his plant reveals
as much about him as it does about his work:
[it] provides a natural frame of security, it gives confidence, shares
money equally, uses all degrees of skill without distinction and en-
ables jobs to be allocated to the man or woman best suited to them,
the allocation frequently being made by the workers themselves.
154
The political self-confidence engendered by workplace participation
can have radiating effects beyond the workplace. Political scientists have
long noted that people with high self-esteem and confidence in their own
political efficacy are more likely to participate in civic affairs.155 As a
consequence, workers who participate in the organization of work are
more active politically.1 56 Thus, several participants in the abortion col-
lective called the experience "radicalizing" or "politicizing," and said it
led to other involvements.1:5 7 But participation can also influence the
political self-image of nonparticipants. Participants come to understand
that they are politically effective because they listen to and learn from
others. By contrast, those who are given little input into decisions that
affect them allow others little input into their own decisions, both at
home and at work.158 But if coercion and manipulation reproduce them-
selves, so may democratic participation. And that means that introduc-
ing any amount of democratic participation, anywhere in our society, at
any time, can produce real and lasting change.
III. Defending Radicalism Against Deconstruction
The conception of radical change I outlined in Part II depends on
153. P. BLUMBERG, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY: THE SOCIOLOGY OF PARTICIPATION 109
(1968); see also C. PATEMAN, supra note 152, at 64 (quoting Blumberg); Tannenbaum, Personality
Change As a Result of an Experimental Change of Environmental Conditions, 55 J. ABNORMAL &
SOC. PSYCH. 404, 406 (1957) (noting a trend in personality toward "equilibrium" with its
environment).
154. Wright, The Gang System in Coventry, 2 ANARCHY 47, 50 (1961).
155. See, eg., G. ALMOND & S. VERBA, supra note 11, at 206-07; A. CAMPBELL, G. GURIN &
W. MILLER, THE VOTER DECIDES 187 (1954); L. MILBRATH, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 59
(1965).
156. See C. PATEMAN, supra note 152, at 52; see also R. BLAUNER, FREEDOM AND ALIENA-
TION: THE FACTORY WORKER AND His INDUSTRY 51-57 (1964) (reporting that printers, who are
involved in their work and have a high level of control and freedom, extend that control to their
social relations); Lipsitz, Work Life and Political Attitudes, 58 AM. POL. SCi. REv. 951 (1964).
157. Schlesinger & Bart, supra note 149, at 147-48.
158. C. PATEMAN, supra note 152, at 49, 53.
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four concepts stressed by Rousseau: participatory democracy, commu-
nity, human nature, and culture. I argued that democratic participation
in community decision making changes people in ways that commit them
more strongly to the sustenance of democratic communities. I defined
this sort of mutual reproduction of personal identity and social relations
as a culture. Because our identities are culturally rooted in relations with
others, I argued that our cultural surroundings set what appear to us to
be "natural" constraints on our possibilities. We can change ourselves, I
concluded, but only by altering the cultural environment that shapes us;
and in this sense, the construction of a culture of democratic participa-
tion changes our nature. By rooting us in a culture of self-realization,
democratic participation can change us radically.
Deconstructive critics, such as Jacques Derrida, Iris Marion Young,
and Bernard Yack, see such Rousseauian radicalism as expressing a to-
talitarian drive for homogeneity. Hence they charge that demands for
democratic participation are motivated by an anti-intellectualism that
limits political argument to the repetition of prevalent cich6s and the
reinforcement of common prejudices; that devotion to community is mo-
tivated by a need for insularity and conformity; and that the longing to
fulfill one's humanity or root one's identity in a culture reflects a need to
stigmatize others as inhuman or inauthentic. In sum, deconstructive
critics read the desire for self-realization as a yearning to overcome alien-
ation by restoring a natural or authentic self. Arguing that all of our
thoughts and desires are mediated, deconstructive critics view any such
aspiration as unachievable. But in an effort to purify the self of external
influence, deconstructive critics charge, radicals are prone to purge their
social environments of dissenting voices and heterogeneous populations.
As the ensuing sections demonstrate, this deconstructive critique
profoundly misconstrues radicalism.
First, radicals demand universal participation in politics, not to
lower debate to the level of the least educated and most parochial, but to
broaden and educate all citizens by involving them in intellectual debate;
assuming that everyone is capable of self-realization, radicals are anti-
elitist, not anti-intellectual.
Second, far from privileging an authentic, unmediated self, radical-
ism proceeds from the premise that all self-knowledge is mediated
through the eyes of others, so that we can change only with the help of
others who are different from us. This entails a community premised on
difference and dissent, not conformity and comfort.
Third, radicalism doesn't seek to restore a natural self, insulated




influence. Thus, the "nature" radicalism hopes to realize is conceived as
a cultural artifact.
Finally, radical theory's identification of discrete cultures is not mo-
tivated by the pursuit of cultural purity. The concept of culture explains
how instrumental identity can be at once contingent and resistant to
change; and gives hope that self-realizing identities can be similarly rein-
forced by their cultural surroundings. By depicting social life as more
contingent, unstructured, and unpredictable than it really is, deconstruc-
tion discourages the long-term commitment to a community or calling
that self-realization requires, and so reinforces instrumental culture.
A. Deconstruction and Democracy
This section will explicate and evaluate Jacques Derrida's critique of
participatory democracy.
Derrida's most important critical work, Of Grammatology, critiques
the privileging of speech over writing he finds implicit in the ideal of
direct democracy, as developed by Rousseau. Derrida argues that polit-
ical communication is always mediated rather than direct, so that Rous-
seau's critique of representation undermines all political arguments,
including Rousseau's own.
Distinguishing social from natural freedom, Rousseau associates so-
cial freedom with direct, deliberative participation in politics-the open
assembly or town meeting.159 Rousseau's critique of political representa-
tion is based on the educative, virtue-inculcating function of par-
ticipatory democracy. 160 Believing that "everything was radically
connected with politics, and that however one proceeded, no people
would be other than the nature of its government,"1 61 Rousseau favors
participation because of its effects on character.162 His emphasis on
political participation flows from his beliefs that both independence and
cooperation require self-reliance. 163 "In a country that is really free, the
citizens do everything with their hands and nothing with money.... ,64
Rousseau's rejection of political representation reflects this general com-
mitment to the view that human beings fulfill and develop their capaci-
159. See J. ROUSSEAU, supra note 14, at 98-101 (only direct democracy preserves freedom); id.
at 19-23 (social contract entails exchange of natural for civil liberty).
160. See G. BINDER, supra note 15, at 75-76 (discussing Rousseau's critique of representation).
161. B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 213 n.1
(1984) (quoting J. ROUSSEAU, CONFESSIONS, bk. 9).
162. See C. PATEMAN, supra note 152, at 24-25; 1 J. PLAMENATZ, MAN AND SOCIETY 440-42
(1963).
163. J. MILLER, supra note 16, at 31-32 (discussing the benefits of work-particularly farming-
and commitment to family and community).
164. J. ROUSSEAU, supra note 14, at 98.
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ties only through action, and that only by trying to affect the world could
they learn from it: "man is born to act and to think, and not to re-
flect." 165 Rousseau therefore conceives of political participation as active
experience, not just as the use of language. Deprived of the opportunity
to deliberate with others, Rousseau implies, citizens can develop no
will. 166 Unless citizens do their own decision making, they can have no
preferences or interests for their representatives to represent.
Derrida offers two related attacks on this position. Derrida's first
objection is that a preference for direct rather than representative democ-
racy reflects a sentimental belief that direct democracy enables the ex-
pression of authentic or unmediated desires. According to Derrida's
account, Rousseau favors speech over writing because writing is a repre-
sentation of speech, using formulaic media of representation. Yet speech
itself is a representation of something else-passion. 167 Even though he
admits that speech contains conventional elements, Rousseau argues that
it also contains a nonformulaic, nonconventional element-the musical
inflection of the particular living voice. 168 However, this live element of
speech turns out to be conventional as well. The alterations of pitch that
give expression to the spoken word, are also dependent, argues Derrida,
on regular, notatable intervals-the intervals that allow music to be re-
produced.169 In order to deny the conventionality and artificiality of mu-
sic, Rousseau must say that music grew out of song, which grew out of
impassioned speech. 170 Thus, the nonlinguistic aspect of speech turns
out to be a representation of language. Hence, Derrida concludes, there
is no origin at which the expression of feeling is any less conventional, or
mediated.
All of this would be quite devastating if Rousseau objected to writ-
ing's artificiality. To the contrary, however, he scorns writing as more
private and hence as less socially constructed than conversation. Writing
facilitates the representation of what the sovereign people would say if
they were assembled together. Rousseau fears that such representation
fixes individual preferences in advance of the political dialogue that alone
can transform them into a sovereign will. The direct dialogue demanded
by Rousseau mediates individual preferences more than representation.
165. Rousseau, Preface to "Narcisse: or the Lover of Himself," in 6 POL. THEORY 543, 550
(1978).
166. See J. ROUSSEAU, supra note 14, at 28, 99 (the "general will" cannot be divided).
167. J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 195 (G. Spivak trans. 1976).
168. J. ROUSSEAU, THE FIRST AND SECOND DISCOURSES AND ESSAY ON THE ORIGIN OF LAN-
GUAGES 239, 255-58 (V. Gourevitch ed. 1986).
169. See J. DERRIDA, supra note 167, at 199-200; see also J. ROUSSEAU, supra note 168, at 288-
90.




Representative democracy rests on the fiction that individual preferences
can be accurately depicted and reflected in social decision making. Di-
rect democracy openly aims at changing them.
Derrida's second objection to Rousseau's critique of representation
is that it is self-consuming. After all, Rousseau writes. And although his
work inspired much political struggle in his native community of Ge-
neva, Rousseau lived in exile and resisted engagement with that strug-
gle. 171 Derrida demonstrates that Rousseau's view of writing as
shameful, sterile, and solitary frequently finds expression in an associa-
tion of writing with what Rousseau regarded as his own particular vice of
masturbation. 172 To write, according to Rousseau, is to fantasize in iso-
lation and spill ink at an absent reader who is helpless to argue or re-
spond. 173 Writing is sterile in the sense that it cannot engender the
voluntary communion established by conversation.1 74
Derrida argues that isolation, far from being the haven of unnatural
acts, is natural and original: masturbation precedes sexual relations,
writing precedes speech, self-reference precedes communication. Der-
rida sees all experience as requiring the active interpretation of its recipi-
ent. Accordingly, all experience is a form of self-stimulation:
Auto-affection is a universal structure of experience. All liv-
ing things are capable of auto-affection. And only a being capable
of symbolizing, that is to say of auto-affecting, may let itself be
affected by the other in general. Auto-affection is the condition of
an experience in general. 175
This startlingly solipsistic position-that others affect us only if we
"let" them-leads to a thoroughly subjectivist account of language, in
which meaning is constructed not culturally but individually.
Conversation is, then, a communication between two absolute
origins that, if one may venture the formula, auto-affect recipro-
cally, repeating as immediate echo the auto-affection produced by
the other. Immediacy is here the myth of consciousness.
176
In conversation-or any other social experience-we are affected not by
the other, but by a fantasy that we conjure up and control. 177 Thus
171. See generally J. MILLER, supra note 16, at 52-54 (describing Rousseau's voluntary lifelong
exile); id. at 126-27 (describing how Rousseau provoked unrest in Geneva, then denied responsibility
and refused involvement).
172. J. DERRIDA, supra note 167, at 150-54.
173. See id. at 151.
174. See id. at 168. Rousseau consoles himself that the victim of his corruption is only himself-
that his self-imposed isolation in a world of libidinal fantasy has at least harmed no one else. Id. at
156.
175. Id. at 165.
176. Id. at 166.
177. Derrida seeks support for this masturbatory vision of experience in Rousseau's statement
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"[s]peech and the consciousness of speech-that is to say consciousness
simply as self-presence-are the phenomenon of an auto-affection lived
as suppression of differance."
178
This reinterpretation of social life as nothing more than a solitary
communion between each individual and a fantasy of her own creation is
individualism pure and simple. Few accounts of communication better
illustrate Marx's claim that "in bourgeois ethics speaking and loving 'are
interpreted as expressions and manifestations of a third artificially intro-
duced Relation, the Relation of utility.' "179 The Derridean self relates
not to other people but only to her own desires. While ostensibly decon-
structing the concepts of subjectivity, nature, and origin, Derrida in fact
treats the autonomous subject, isolated in an experiential world of her
own creation, as natural and original.18 0
Thus it is Derrida rather than Rousseau who gives voice to nostalgia
for a presocial origin. Granted, Rousseau offers a Discourse on the Ori-
gins of Inequality and an Essay on the Origin of Languages. But as Paul
de Man points out, in a critique of Derrida's reading of Rousseau, Rous-
seau's rhetoric favors
[d]iachronic structures... over pseudo-synchronic structures...
because the latter mislead one into believing in a stability of mean-
ing that does not exist. The elegiac tone that is occasionally
sounded does not express a nostalgia for an original presence but is
a purely dramatic devie.... The origin here "precedes" the pres-
ent for purely structural and not chronological reasons.1""
Seen in this light, Rousseau's "nature" is not a presocial condition
located in the historical past; it is instead the world conjured by the im-
agination.1812 The exclusive pursuit of this "natural" freedom, however,
is contrary to a human nature that fulfills itself by transcending the natu-
ral. Human beings live in a social world, and so can experience only
social freedom.183 As radical democrat Benjamin Barber writes,
that "[h]e who imagines nothing senses no-one but himself; he is alone in the midst of humankind."
Id. at 187 (quoting J. ROUSSEAU, supra note 168, at 32). But there is a profound difference between
Rousseau's position and Derrida's: Derrida thinks that even he who uses his imagination sees no
one but himself.
178. Id. at 166. "Differance" is Derrida's term for the distinction between contexts that pre-
vents any unit of language from ever meaning--or even being-the same thing twice. Id.
179. B. OLLMAN, ALIENATION: MARX'S CONCEPTION OF MAN IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY 43
(1971) (quoting Marx's German Ideology).
180. See A. NORTON, REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL IDENTITY 30 (1988).
181. P. DE MAN, BLINDNESS AND INSIGHT: ESSAYS IN THE RHETORIC OF CONTEMPORARY
CRITICISM 133-34 (W. Godzich ed. 1971).
182. See J. MILLER, supra note 16, at 177. Derrida notes the place of imagination in Rousseau's
conception of human nature, see J. DERRIDA, supra note 167, at 185-87, but suppresses the implica-
tion that human nature is therefore artificial rather than original.




If the human essence is social, then men and women have to
choose not between independence or dependence but between citi-
zenship or slavery....
To a strong democrat, Rousseau's assertion ... that man is
born free yet is everywhere in chains does not mean that man is
free by nature but society enchains him. It means rather that natu-
ral freedom is an abstraction, whereas dependency is the concrete
human reality, and that the aim of politics must therefore be not to
rescue natural freedom from politics but to invent and pursue arti-
ficial freedom within and through politics.
18 4
Rousseau presents all of his key political values-freedom, community,
and democracy-as achievements of human artifice.
Yet Derrida associates these values with a metaphysics of "pres-
ence" that views artifice as inauthentic. Derrida mocks the "affective
impulse" he detects in Rousseau and in Claude Levi-Strauss toward the
"islets of resistance" to commercial capitalism found in "the small com-
munities that have provisionally protected themselves from.., a corrup-
tion linked... to writing and to the dislocation of a unanimous people
assembled in the self-presence of its speech."18 5 Derrida then broadens
his attack from Rousseau and Levi-Strauss to the whole radical tradition:
Self-presence, transparent proximity in the face-to-face of counte-
nances and the immediate range of the voice, this determination of
social authenticity ... relates ... to the Anarchistic and Liberta-
rian protestations against Law, the Powers, and the State in gen-
eral, and also with the dream of the nineteenth-century Utopian
Socialists, most specifically with the dream of Fourierism.
186
Derrida's charge that radicalism embodies a metaphysics of pres-
ence generalizes to all radicals his reading of a Rousseau wracked by self-
hatred and self-delusion.
First, Derrida means to generalize his charge that a written critique
of representation is self-contradictory. In privileging presence over rep-
resentation, radicals reveal themselves to be self-hating intellectuals, ro-
manticizing ignorance as innocence and inarticulateness as authenticity.
Derrida, whose idiosyncratic coinages and daunting constructions resist
interpretation, could not disagree more with Rousseau's axiom that "any
tongue with which one cannot make oneself understood to the people
"[Mian is born to act and to think, and not reflect." Rousseau, supra note 165, at 550. To merely
imagine freedom is to endure the most perfect form of subjection. J. ROUSSEAU, EMILE, OR ON
EDUCATION 120 (A. Bloom trans. 1979). The real freedom made possible by social engagement
requires just as much imagination. See supra note 177.
184. B. BARBER, supra note 161, at 216 (footnote omitted). In rhetoric deliberately evocative of
Rousseau, Barber continues, "We are born insufficient, we need cooperation; we are born with po-
tential natures, we require society to realize them." Id.
185. L DERRIDA, supra note 167, at 134.
186. Id. at 138.
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assembled is a slavish tongue. It is impossible for a people to remain free
and speak the tongue."' 18 7 For Derrida this requirement of rhetorical
humility debases political argument and ultimately requires the intellec-
tual to present herself inauthentically. But this characterization of direct
democracy as anti-intellectual ignores the educative function of political
participation. Radical democrats value intellectual debate so much, they
think everyone will benefit by engaging in it-even intellectuals. Thus
the requirement that intellectuals address the public is not a requirement
that they disguise their views, but that they communicate them. And
while their views may change in the process of communication, that is
what politics is all about-transforming its participants, not preserving
an authentic, prepolitical self.
In associating radicalism with the metaphysics of presence, Derrida
depicts all radicals as not only self-hating, but self-deluded. Accordingly,
the radical ideals of direct democracy and community rest on the "delu-
sion" that face-to-face politics can avoid the alienation and mediation
that are the preconditions of communication.18 8 But radical democrats
are not so deluded. What they demand is not speech but dialogue, not
"presence" but interaction. "At the heart of strong democracy," writes
Benjamin Barber, "is talk.... [T]alk is not mere speech. It refers here to
every interaction that involves language or linguistic symbols."18 9 The
mischaracterization of democratic deliberation as "speech" depends on
the instrumentalist assumption that its purpose is to reveal rather than to
change preferences.' 90 The advantage of face-to-face political debate is
not that it "presents" us to one another without distortion, but that it
enables us to change and be changed by one another.
Is this belief in the power of citizens to reshape themselves through
language naive? Not if experience is any guide. After studying participa-
tion in a cooperative crisis intervention center and a New England town
meeting, Jane Mansbridge concluded:
Face-to-face assemblies have their advantages. In an assembly of
all the members, ideas, emotions, and points of view surface that
rarely reach elected or appointed representatives. The rank-and-
filers can themselves listen to points in a debate, mull the issues
over, ask questions, draw their own conclusions, and make their
decisions on how to act. By acting themselves, they make them-
selves responsible for the collective action. The government be-
comes us not them. Moreover, in an assembly, one sees the
187. Id.
188. Id. at 139.
189. B. BARBER, supra note 161, at 173.




opposition. Ideas that one would normally reject out of hand come
from people one knows, people who may have believable reasons
for espousing them. Finally, when an assembly struggles through
to a satisfactory conclusion on a difficult issue, the very act of con-
gregating produces mutual pride and a feeling of communion.191
Participation, then, is more than just talk. It changes the participants by
confronting them with opposing views and with the human consequences
of their decisions. It also changes them by conferring personal responsi-
bility to support and implement their own decisions. As we have seen,
the increased self-confidence engendered by this responsibility makes
participants in workplace democracy more willing to consult others.
And by thus sharing responsibility, democratic participants reproduce
self-confidence in others.
The radical critique of representation is not based on the belief that
conversation is more "natural" than writing. To the contrary, the prob-
lem with political representation is that it leaves people in their original
state, whereas political deliberation engages them and transforms them
into citizens. This transformation is possible because the citizens are dif-
ferent from each other. Participation in a political community continu-
ally transforms the participants by exposing them to one another, not by
making them all the same. 192 Deconstructive critics systematically mis-
read radical democrats because, viewing discussion as a solipsistic exer-
cise, they deny it can change people.
B. Deconstruction and Community
Philosopher Iris Marion Young exemplifies this assumption in ap-
plying Derrida's critique of radicalism to the ideal of community. Young
argues:
[T]he ideal of community participates in what Derrida calls the
metaphysics of presence..., a metaphysics that denies difference.
The ideal of community presumes subjects can understand one an-
other as they understand themselves. It thus denies the difference
between subjects. 193
191. Mansbridge, Fears of Conflict in Face-to-Face Democracies, in WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY
AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 147, at 125, 126-27. See generally J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND
ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY (1980).
192.
Because conversation responds to the endless variety of human experience and respects the
initial legitimacy of every human perspective, it is served by many voices rather than by
one and achieves a rich ambiguity rather than a narrow clarity. It aims at creating a sense
of commonality, not of unity, and the mutualism it aspires to weaves into one carpet the
threads of a hundred viewpoints.
B. BARBER, supra note 161, at 185.
193. Young, supra note 8, at 302.
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According to Young, "most radical theorists seek to understand commu-
nity as a unification of particular persons through the sharing of subjec-
tivities: Persons will cease to be opaque, other, not understood, and
instead become fused, mutually sympathetic, understanding one another
as they understand themselves." 194 Young points out that such a vision
of community would be futile, since individuals are not transparently
self-aware. 195 We cannot understand others as ourselves ff we do not
understand ourselves.
But is the naive assumption that individuals are transparently self-
aware inherent in the value of community? Radicals are drawn to the
idea of community to the extent they believe we can only realize our-
selves with the help of others. Why would they embrace the view that we
can know ourselves without the help of others? Young endorses Hegel's
claim that others understand us better than we understand ourselves,
96
but ignores its implication that we need relations with others in order to
understand ourselves. 197 Thus community is created not by allowing the
other to see us through our own eyes, but by allowing the other to see
herself through our eyes. That is why community can occasion self-reali-
zation-because it constantly changes the way we see ourselves. It is the
self-transformation generated by commitment to others that enables us
collectively to recreate society-and that is what opens up the possibility
of radical change. But Young sees this very possibility of self-transfor-
mation as a threat of violence from the other that renders community
impossible: "The other person may at the next moment understand my
words differently from the way I meant them or carry my actions to
consequences I do not intend."'198 Communitarians would say that it is
the other person's capacity to reinterpret our actions that makes self-
knowledge possible and community desirable. By contrast, Young per-
petuates the liberal vision of the self as an autonomous source of meaning
and value, unaffected by others.
Having misportrayed radical communitarianism, Young goes on-
in a tactic common among post-structuralists' 99-to condemn it by asso-
194. Id. at 309.
195. Id. at 310.
196. Id. at 309-11.
197. See G. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 218-40 (J. Baillie trans. 1967).
198. Young, supra note 8, at 310.
199. See Derrida, Like the Sound of the Sea Deep Within a Shell Paul de Man's War, 14 CRIT-
CAL INQUIRY 590 (1988) (identifying unsympathetic readers of de Man's anti-Semitic wartime writ-
ing with Nazism, "in that to condemn de Man on the basis of a brief episode is to reproduce the
exterminating gesture of which he is accused"); cf Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and
Identity at the Trial of Klaus Barbie (pt. IV), 98 YALE L.J. 1321, 1323-24 (1989) (showing that
Derrida equates even the embrace of Jewish identity with Nazism). See J. LYOTARD, THE POST-




ciation. "The desire for community relies on the same desire for social
wholeness and identification that underlies racism and ethnic chauvinism
on the one hand and political sectarianism on the other." 200 This sort of
hyperbole provokes a number of questions. Is the desire for interracial
community really the same desire that underlies racism? Is the desire to
participate in debate with one's fellow citizens really the same desire that
underlies political sectarianism? Does membership in, say, an intellec-
tual community preclude the expression of "differences"? 2 1 Precisely
which political positions are being denoted by "political sectarianism"
and thereby associated with racism? Are we being cowed into equating
intolerance of racism with racist intolerance? Identifying Marxism or
participatory democracy with racism? Separated only by a few seem-
ingly ornamental letters from the embarrassment of communism, com-
munitarianism makes otherwise careful thinkers see red.
C. Deconstruction and Human Nature
Deconstructive critics have seen a totalitarian "desire for social
wholeness" implicit in the concept of human nature as well as that of
community.
Like Derrida, Bernard Yack critiques radicalism as a futile longing
to overcome humanity's alienation from nature. But while Derrida rep-
resents this longing as a desire to discard artifice and naturalize human-
ity, Yack represents the radical impulse as a desire to conquer, or to
humanize nature. For Yack, radicals are control freaks, seeking to ab-
sorb and subdue every alien element in their surroundings by viewing
society as a totality which is either entirely subject to their will or un-
bearably alien. "Longing for total revolution," radicals are inevitably
totalitarian.
According to Yack, "Left-Kantians" such as the young Hegel, and
"Left-Hegelians" like the young Marx, sought to reconcile human free-
dom and natural necessity by realizing human freedom in the world. Ar-
guing that human freedom is purely intellectual, Yack insists that this
aspiration to embody it in social relations reflected a category mistake.
20 2
This philosophical error, Yack argues, engendered a sense of alienation
1984) (holding Kant and Hegel responsible for 20th-century terror); cf Benhabib, Epistemologies of
Post-Modernism: A Rejoinder to Jean-Frangois Lyotard, in FEMINISM/POST-MODERNISM, supra
note 8, at 107, 121 (calling this hyperbole).
200. Young, supra note 8, at 302.
201. See M. MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERI-
CAN LAW 293-94 (1990) (arguing that the right to argue is a community-affirming recognition of
difference).
202. B. YACK, supra note 1, at 98-208.
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in a world resistant to human will, which in turn inspired a futile longing
to eradicate all constraint.
This critique of radicalism hinges upon a conflation of two types of
constraint-the societal determination of the individual and the natural
determination of society.
Yack first mischaracterizes radicalism as an individualist doctrine,
claiming it offers "a definition of man's humanity in terms of the individ-
ual's ability to resist external conditioning. ' 20 3 He rightly concludes that
such a definition would rule out "the realization of our humanity in the
[social] world," because it would condemn as dehumanizing any social
relationship that "conditions our behavior"-which is to say any social
relationship at all. 2 4 But since radicals regard the individual's respon-
siveness to social conditioning as the source of humanity's collective ca-
pacity for radical change, they do not aspire to free the individual from
social determination.
Even if radicalism is conceived as an effort to create social condi-
tions conducive to "realizing humanity," however, Yack argues that it is
vitiated by a "contradiction." If the radical admits that social relations
are not inherently dehumanizing, Yack asks, how can she explain the
presence in society of any dehumanizing relations? The radical's only
alternative, Yack concludes, is to attribute dehumanization to an all-per-
vasive "spirit of modern society, rather than social interaction per se."'205
This argument involves an excluded middle fallacy. Its unstated
premise is that radicals must view all social relations as dehumanizing, or
none. Accordingly, Yack assumes what he should prove-that radicals
necessarily see dehumanization and human fulfillment as totalities.20 6
The kernel of truth that gives this assumption a surface plausibility
is the fact that radicals do see dehumanization as systemic. But to say
that dehumanizing relations are causally related to one another is not to
say that they are caused by some force outside of social relations. That
social relations affect one another is a testament to society's self-determi-
nation rather than its determination by external forces. Social relations
influence each other because people affect one another. Thus, as I have
argued, the pursuit of self-realization through participation in self-gov-
ernment has an enabling effect on self-realization by others. Similarly,
coercion and manipulation has a disabling effect on the efforts of others
203. Id. at 366.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. If "necessarily" seems to place an unfairly heavy burden on Yack, consider his claim that
"any attempt to define the obstacle to the realization of humanity in terms of a particular, historical




to realize themselves. It induces instrumental behavior in return. Thus
dehumanizing social relations are systemic because they have a multi-
plier effect. But by the same token, humanizing social relations have a
multiplier effect as well. And that means that radicals can aspire to iden-
tify, uproot, and replace dehumanizing systems of social relations by
strategies short of "total revolution. ' 20 7 Because humanizing and dehu-
manizing relations are both inherently expansionist, they cannot coexist
peacefully or stably. But they can and do coexist.
Having excluded that middle possibility, Yack reasons that radicals
are condemned to explain systemic dehumanization by forces beyond the
capacity of human beings to control. "If every social phenomenon is
always shaped by the spirit of social interaction that informs its epoch or
society as a whole, then social phenomena will always be externally con-
ditioned." 208 Given that social relations are mutually reinforcing, how-
ever, Yack's conclusion does not follow. Systems of mutually reinforcing
social relations could be characterized by a single, self-sustaining
"spirit"-what I have called a culture-without being externally
conditioned.
The source of Yack's insistence that social relations are necessarily
conditioned by something outside of themselves is his assumption that
there is an irreducible gap between a material world determined by na-
ture, and a mental domain in which humans are free to think what they
will without effect. This is more than a claim that social relations are
conditioned by material scarcity, for Yack views nature as a "social
source[] of dissatisfaction. '20 9 Because social interaction takes place in a
material world to which the mind is alien, Yack implies, every social
interaction is dehumanizing. Yack proceeds from mind-body dualism to
the individualist conclusion that each person is utterly alien from every
other. Like Derrida and Young, Yack ignores the fact that individual
identity is a social construct, that we are more ourselves in a social world
than in isolation.
207. Barber is an example of a radical democrat whose faith in the transformative power of
participation is so great that he thinks it can and should be introduced piecemeal, through incremen-
tal reform. B. BARBER, supra note 161, at 309. Radicals who, following Marx, believe that par-
ticipatory enclaves will inevitably be swept under by market forces, should be even more pessimistic
about the prospects of revolutionary change than they are about the efficacy of reform. Przeworski
is an example of such a rigorously pessimistic radical. See A. PRZEWORSKI, CAPITALISM AND SO-
CIAL DEMOCRACY (1985).
208. B. YACK, supra note 1, at 366-67.
209. Id. at 366, 369 (emphasis added). Yack says very little about what he takes to be these
irreducible social sources of dissatisfaction. But he does say that "we cannot separate the forms
taken by our social interaction from that which is dehumanizing: the external conditioning of our




The mind-body dualism underlying Yack's individualism cannot be
sustained. We are neither disembodied minds, nor prisoners of our bod-
ies: to the contrary, the fact that we are bodies situated in a natural
world is what enables us to organize, communicate, indeed to have expe-
rience.210 At the same time we are active participants in our experience,
not just by interpreting "nature," not just by constructing the language
and culture that enable interpretation, but by influencing the "natural"
conditions of perception-including the human body.
Consider Alison Jaggar's discussion of the social conditioning of ap-
parently "natural" sex differences.
The hand is not the only organ that is a result as well as a cause of
our system of social organization. Even our reproductive biology,
the most basic sex difference of all, is in part a social product. In
the course of human evolution, as our ancestors became bipedal
tool-users through [a] historical process... bipedalism reduced the
size of the bony birth canal in women. Simultaneously tool use
selected for larger brain size and consequently for larger bony
skulls in infants. This "obstetrical dilemma"... was solved by the
infants' being born in an earlier state of development. But this in
itself was possible only insofar as adults, being already bipedal,
were able to carry the infants who were too small to cling on by
themselves. And it was possible only because human social organi-
zation was so far developed that other adults would cooperate with
the mother sufficiently to support a long period of infant
dependence. 2
11
Examples of this sort can be multiplied: the increase in human life ex-
pectancy is a collective cultural achievement that removes natural con-
straints to individual achievement. In a more striking example of the
cultural dependence of such natural constraints, psychologists Ellen
Langer and Judith Rodin found that participation in decision making
increased not just the psychic but the physical health of nursing home
patients-they lived longer.212
In general, concludes Dorothy Dinnerstein,
humans are by nature unnatural. We do not yet walk "naturally"
on our hindlegs .... Yet this unnatural posture, forced on the
unwilling body by the project of tool-using, is precisely what has
made possible the development of important aspects of our "na-
ture": the hand and the brain, and the complex system of skills,
language, and social arrangements which were both effects and
causes of hand and brain. Man-made and physiological structures
210. See generally M. JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND: THE BODILY BASIS OF MEANING,
IMAGINATION, AND REASON (1987).
211. A. JAGGAR, FEMINIST PoLrTcs AND HUMAN NATURE 11 (1984).




have thus come to interpenetrate so thoroughly that to call a
human project contrary to human biology is naive: we are what we
have made ourselves, and we must continue to make ourselves as
long as we exist at all.2
13
A similarly cultural conception of human nature is offered by Peter Ber-
ger and Thomas Luckmann:
Man is biologically predestined to construct and inhabit a world
with others. This world becomes for him the dominant and defini-
tive reality. Its limits are set by nature, but once constructed, this
world acts back on nature. In the dialectic between nature and the
socially constructed world the human organism is itself trans-
formed. In this same dialectic, man produces reality and thereby
produces himself.
214
From the perspective of these radical social theorists, the distinction be-
tween natural constraint and human adaptability is insupportable.
Human inventiveness is a natural capacity with consequences in the nat-
ural world. It is not that humanity is faced with no constraints-it is
that constraint is what human beings naturally adapt themselves to.
The reconstruction of radicalism I have offered in this essay sees
nothing alien in our dependence on others and so nothing troubling in
our adaptation to circumstances beyond our control. The radical hope
that our social relations will challenge us to discover the unexpected in
ourselves is inconsistent with the totalitarian impulse to control our expe-
rience in advance.
D. Deconstruction and Cultural Identity
We have seen that deconstructive critics ascribe totalitarian implica-
tions to the concepts of participation, community, and human nature.
According to these critics, radicals deploy these terms in an effort to
portray social relations among heterogeneous elements as inauthentic, in-
coherent, unnatural, or inhuman. Deconstructive critics assign the con-
cept of cultural identity a similar rhetorical function: by bounding off
discrete cultures, we stigmatize the rest of our social surroundings as for-
eign or inauthentic. And by identifying ourselves with discrete cultures,
we suppress heterogeneity within ourselves. Accordingly, the decon-
structive critics view the radical's aspiration to redefine her culture as a
totalitarian impulse to purify herself.
This section will argue that the deconstructive critique of cultural
213. D. DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR: SEXUAL ARRANGEMENTS AND
HUMAN MALAISE 21-22 (1976).
214. P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 183 (1966). For
an early expression of a similar perspective, see 1 F. LIEBER, supra note 61, at 132-33.
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identity relies on psychological intuitions peculiarly applicable to instru-
mental culture. As a result, the deconstructive claim that there are no
identifiable cultures is revealed to be ethnocentric.
Why do radicals seek to identify discrete cultures? Rooting oppres-
sion in human nature, radicals wager their hopes for progressive change
on a view of human nature as contingent because culturally produced.
But the more contingent human nature becomes, the less work it can do
in explaining the persistence of oppression. Thus the concept of culture
plays a mediating role in radical thought: the cultural construction of a
stable human nature explains why social change is possible, but also why
society is resistant to change. It enables radicals to treat society as a
contingent system or structure.
Dissatisfaction with the instrumentalist assumptions of Marxism
has compelled radicals to reconceive society as a system of contingent
meanings rather than fixed material interests. Accordingly, radical theo-
rists have been attracted to the deconstructive claim that
language, broadly conceived as systems of signification that extend
well beyond mere words to include the symbols and structures of
all ways of communicating... is the essential ground within which
social life is embedded.
215
But where radicalism requires a conception of cultural meaning as both
contingent and systematic, deconstruction emphasizes only the contin-
gency of meaning, denying that it is systematic. Deconstructive critics
and reconstructed radicals can agree that social orders lack any constitu-
tive foundation: there is no law determining any social order that is dis-
tinguishable from the social order itself. But deconstructive critics go on
to conclude that the social order has no order-that the cultural system
is not a system. Because cultures have no constitutive law, deconstruc-
tion denies that they have any regulative structure.216 If society can have
no regularity, no identity over time, it also cannot change its identity.
Radical social change becomes an impossibility.
For Derrida, there can be no local cultures, because culture is a
boundless and seamless web. Referring to culturally mediated meaning
as "discourse," Derrida defines discourse as "the present, living, con-
scious representation of a text within the experience of the person who
writes or reads it," but observes that a text "constantly goes beyond this
representation by the entire system of its resources and its own laws. '217
215. B. PALMER, supra note 7, at 3.
216. K. SOPER, HUMANISM AND ANTI-HUMANISM 141-42 (1986).




Accordingly, "there is nothing outside of the text, '218 in the double sense
that any discourse refers to all other discourse, and that all social life is
discursive. There is no place outside of one's own culture from which to
critique it, no boundary beyond which alien values may be expelled.
One implication of the seamlessness of culture is that every attempt
at radical critique must be self-consuming. Endemic to cultural commu-
nication itself, the cultural sources of oppression can never be isolated
and eradicated. 219 Doomed to futility, the effort to expunge oppressive
elements from a culture will entail the kind of compulsive repetition we
have already associated with revolutionary purges. Derrida concludes
that every effort to eradicate oppression reproduces it.22o
Because any criterion of cultural authenticity bounds culture artifi-
cially, its correlative criterion of inauthenticity carves out an internal
Gulag to which we can exile all the parts of ourselves we would prefer to
view as alien. Unable to purify ourselves of shameful traits, we disown
them and blame their presence within us on foreign influences. And the
more we unjustly project our sins onto others, the greater the burden of
sin we have to displace; so that our cultural traditions consist in the be-
quest of memories repressed rather than preserved. On this view, there
are no continuous cultures. The construction of any cultural tradition
involves a lie, violently erasing the evidence of earlier lies.221 Since there
218. Id. at 158.
219.
And if a text always gives itself a certain representation of its own roots, those roots live
only by that representation, by never touching the soil, so to speak. Which undoubtedly
destroys their radical essence .... [T]o say that a text is never anything but a system of




Is there a systematic set of themes... which, forming a closed and identifiable coherence
with what we call totalitarianism, fascism, nazism, racism, antisemitism, never appear
outside these formations and especially never on the opposite side?... Is there some prop-
erty so closed and so pure that one may not find any element of these systems in discourses
that are commonly opposed to them? ... I do not believe that there is.
Derrida, supra note 199, at 645. This position is an illustration of the modern proverb that there is
such a thing as being so open-minded that your brains fall out.
221. See J. DERRIDA, Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel
Levinas, in WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 79-153 (A. Bass trans. 1978) (arguing that the concept of
identity is intolerant and violent); R. GIRARD, VIOLENCE AND THE SACRED (P. Gregory trans.
1977) (asserting that all cultural signification is based on the pattern of scapegoating); P. DE MAN,
Excuses (Confessions), in ALLEGORIES OF READING: FIGURAL LANGUAGE IN ROUSSEAU, NIETZ-
SCHE, RILKE, AND PROUST 278, 279 (1979) (suggesting that literary language faces the repetitive
task of covering up its crimes of covering up crimes); E. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978) (suggesting that
the sentimental study of foreign cultures is a projection of desires repressed in Western culture). For
the roots of the idea that all culture consists in the displacement of guilt over an original crime, see S.




can be no discrete, self-identical cultures, culture cannot confer the kind
of bounded and coherent identities its participants yearn for.
This deconstructive critique of cultural identity rests on a series of
superficially plausible psychological222 intuitions which we might sche-
matize as follows:
1. Everyone yearns for identity.
2. Identity implies consistency.
3. But identity also implies stability.
4. Everyone has inconsistent characteristics.
5. So everyone faces a dilemma between inconsistency or
instability.
6. This dilemma can be avoided by disavowing some characteris-
tics and projecting them onto others.
The first and fourth intuitions are unexceptionable; the fifth and
sixth follow from the first four; but what about the second and third
intuitions? Does the yearning for identity necessarily involve a desire for
stability and consistency? It probably does in an instrumental culture
that associates autonomy and integrity with the ability to resist the influ-
ence of others. Such a culture expects us to define our goals indepen-
dently and stick to them. But what kind of identity do we commit
ourselves to when we pursue self-realization? Self-realizers commit
themselves to change in response to experience. If we hope to realize
civic identities through democratic participation, we commit ourselves to
be affected by one another and we make the realization of our identities
dependent on one another's participation.
But won't we still be tempted to seek scapegoats for our own inade-
quacies, even in a culture of self-realization? Perhaps, but the temptation
will be weaker because the recognition of one's own inadequacies poses
no threat to the identity of a self-realizer. To the contrary, self-realiza-
tion depends on the perpetual identification and transcendence of inade-
quacy. My point is not that a culture of democratic participation turns
its participants into angels-only that it absolves them of the obligation
to regard themselves as angels. The identities conferred by such a cul-
ture don't necessarily preclude the pathologies deconstructive critics
ascribe to all culture-but neither do they compel such pathologies.
If the deconstructive critique of cultural identity resonates with our
psychological experience, that may be because its psychological assump-
tions fit our particular culture. Denying that there are any discrete cul-
222. An often overlooked irony in deconstruction's attack on the identity of the "subject" is its
covert reliance on psychological defense mechanisms to coherently account for the contradictions it




tures, deconstructive critics assume that psychological intuitions
applicable in one cultural setting are universally valid. But in so doing
they assume what they should prove.
The claim that there are no discrete cultures is probably true within
an instrumental culture that treats cultural commitments as the choice of
a garnish or an ornamental fagade-Dijon or Teriyaki, Tudor or French
Provincial. And skepticism about personal identity is justified when con-
sumers are reduced to identifying themselves by such choices. The more
we consume empty packages of cultural associations, the emptier we feel
inside-an emptiness we hasten to conceal with another image-making
purchase.223 All of this is true of our particular culture. But it doesn't
prove that we cannot construct a radically different culture. By treating
instrumental culture as the only possible culture, deconstruction discour-
ages any effort to replace it.
Because the deconstructive critique of instrumental culture is pre-
mised on that culture's inevitability, it has a disturbingly ambiguous
quality. It is made to look like the scaffolding that attends the disman-
tling of a condemned building. But it can also be read as the latest fash-
ion in architectural illusion, a fagade of ironic detachment suspended
from the sturdy structure it ornaments. Deconstruction offers us a hip
attitude toward what we are destined, in any case, to accept. And so
makes its acceptance that much easier.
This ambiguity between critique and ornament is typical of
postmodernist cultural movements generally. In postmodern art, for ex-
ample, "the fiction of the creating subject gives way to frank confisca-
tion, quotation, excerption, accumulation and repetition of already
existing images. '2 24 Such art protests its own commodification-but
how seriously can we take a protest of consumerism that offers itself for
sale? In postmodern society, observes Frederic Jameson, the production
of culture "has become integrated into commodity production generally:
the frantic economic urgency of producing fresh waves of ever more
novel-seeming goods (from clothes to airplanes), at ever greater rates of
turnover, now assigns an increasingly essential structural function and
position to aesthetic innovation and experimentation. '225 In such a con-
text, the critical content of postmodernism is far less important than its
stylistic celebration of novelty, ephemerality, and fragmentation.
223. See M. KELMAN, supra note 99, at 132 (discussing goods-addiction and status-purchases);
Kelman, supra note 146, at 772-73.
224. Crimp, On the Museum's Ruins, in THE ANTI-AESTHETIC: ESSAYS ON POST-MODERN
CULTURE 43, 44-45 (H. Foster ed. 1983).
225. D. HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY 63 (1989) (quoting Jameson,
Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, 146 NEw LEFT REV. 53, 56 (1984)).
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Presenting politics as a "created world of images, sounds, and scenarios,"
broadcast by unseen powers,226 postmodernism teaches us that we might
as well sit back and enjoy it, because participation is pointless.
Postmodernism began as a critique of modernist culture and its ob-
session with planning social life. But like so many other rhetorics of
resistance, postmodernism was quickly bought up by the very culture it
critiqued and then resold for profit. Developers slapped art deco fagades
on suburban shopping malls, while motel chains repapered their walls in
aubergine and British racing green. Behind the ornament, however, the
machinery of modernism proceeded according to plan: "We feel that
postmodernism is over," a prominent United States developer told the
architect Moshe Safdie. "For projects which are going to be ready in five
years, we are now considering new architectural appointments. ' 227 The
planned obsolescence of postmodernism, however, merely reiterates the
original joke: that the term refutes itself. What could be more modernist
than a critique of modernism as outmoded? And what could be more
complicit than trashing a culture designed for disposal?
IV. Conclusion: Between Revolution and Critique
Two practices have organized radical theorizing since World War
II: revolution and critique. For the postwar generation, witnessing the
worldwide process of decolonization, to identify with the left was to sup-
port revolutionary struggles for national liberation. Marxism supplied
the dominant rhetoric. But during the last third of the twentieth cen-
tury, the revolutionary engagement of radical theory has gradually been
supplanted by a posture of critical withdrawal, and deconstruction has
supplied the dominant rhetoric.
This essay has argued that neither practice can ground a concep-
tually coherent and politically appealing account of radical change.
Conceptually, neither revolutionary theorizing in the tradition of
Marx nor deconstructive criticism as practiced by Derrida can account
for radical change, because both view society as a totality. Miscon-
ceiving radical change as total change, revolutionary theorists have
slighted local and incremental strategies, while revolutionaries have con-
sumed their societies in Sysiphean struggles to purge every vestige of the
past. Recognizing the impossibility of total change, deconstructive crit-
ics assume the impossibility of radical change, reducing their own radi-
calism to a matter of aesthetic attitude.
226. Wolin, Democracy in the Discourse of Post-Modernism, 57 Soc. RES. 1, 27-28 (1990).




Politically, both practices reinforce instrumental culture. The high
stakes at risk in all-or-nothing revolutionary strategies have a tendency
to concentrate decision making in the hands of a zealous elite. On the
other hand, the postmodern attitude that politics is a superficial realm of
imagery in which nothing is really at stake integrates supposedly radical
criticism into the production and consumption of commodities. Both
strategies recognize that individual identity is socially determined, but
both forget the capacity of communities of social agents to collectively
redefine themselves that originally inspired the radical tradition.
This essay has urged that radical theorizing reorganize itself around
this venerable model of radical change. By focusing on the transforma-
tion of social actors rather than social orders, radical theory can recog-
nize the possibility of change that is less self-consuming than the pursuit
of total revolution and more meaningful than the reproduction of
planned obsolescence. The point of focusing in on social actors is not to
detach the individuals from their cultural context, but to recognize that
these cultural contexts are mediated through and reproduced by the indi-
vidual identities they construct. Individuals cannot change by them-
selves-but the cultural settings in which their identities are rooted are
sufficiently localized to permit meaningful change through collective
action.
The way that social actors can radically transform themselves is by
constructing social settings which enable self-realization for themselves
and others-typically by constituting communities which define and al-
locate the responsibilities of their members through participatory deci-
sion making. Such communities need not be universal or all-
encompassing. Democratic culture is no hothouse specimen that shrivels
upon exposure to heterogeneity. It is an open system, robustly capable of
influencing its surroundings and reproducing itself in an inhospitable en-
vironment. The task for radical theory is to look hard at the glittering
fagade of instrumental culture: in the tiniest crack, democracy can take
root.
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